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PREFACE 
The body of this dissertation is composed of three separate essays. The first essay 
was written with a focus on the consideration of income risk in the formulation of policies 
which are designed to protect groundwater from intrusion of agricultural pesticides and 
fertilizers. The primary goal of this research was to examine the link between income risk 
and the effectiveness of these policies. 
Bio-physical simulation is used to develop yield, leaching , and run-off for 
common cropping activities. A safety-first model of income risk is combined with an 
environmental impact measure to account for both economic and environmental impacts. 
Fragility of results from model specification as well as the failure to consider income risk is 
developed. 
The second essay focuses on pesticide productivity in Upland cotton. Previous 
research has used aggregate time series data to estimate pesticide productivity. These 
estimates are likely to contain biases resulting from the nature of aggregate data as well as 
the functional specification. A damage abatement specification is used with specific 
chemical data to derive marginal productivity estimates of chemical components for a 
sample of Texas Upland cotton producers. 
Essay three is an examination of policies which consider the inherent spatial nature 
of agricultural production and the relative efficiency of these policies. This research is 
iii 
intended to shed some light on different policies which are targeted towards controlling 
agricultural pollution efficiently. 
A theoretical examination of policies which account for spatial differentiation in 
agriculture is developed. A discrete-time, stochastic dynamic-optimization problem is 
formulated and used to compare the polices of land use permits and spatially differentiated 
taxes which target nitrogen leachate for a sub-watershed in Western Oklahoma. Policies 
which consider spatial differences in agricultural production are more efficient than those 
which do not. 
Each of these essays is meant to be read as a separate work and they are clearly 
divided in the dissertation. Each essay has an abstract which more fully describes the 
purpose and intent of each essay and should be used to fully understand the content of 
each essay and the complete dissertation. 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Often, the completion a task disguises how difficult the path was and makes us 
forget those who made finishing possible. I apologize forthrightly to those whom I have 
forgotten to thank and those who I neglect to thank here. 
Foremost, however, I must give thanks to God for giving me strength, hope, 
knowledge, and especially my wife who provided me with love and support throughout 
my pursuit of this Ph.D. Andrea, I am grateful for your encouragement and strength 
whenever things looked bleak and your excitement when everything went well. I could 
not have accomplished this without you and look forward to spending the rest of my life 
making up for all the hours I neglected you in favor of a book. 
Appreciation must be extended to my parents Stuart and Deanna Lehr. To my 
father, who taught me perseverance, my mother who taught me patience, and both who 
taught me the value of knowledge, I owe a great deal. Also, I must recognize Stanley and 
Judy Book who have been more than supportive. I hope Andrea and I have made all of 
you proud in our accomplishments and will continue to do so though out our lives. 
To Dr. Harry Mapp, my thesis advisor, committee chairman, and mentor, I am 
grateful you guidance and financial support in this endeavor. Thanks must be extended to 
Dr. Francis Epplin, Dr. Art Stoecker, and Dr. Ron Elliott for their input and help in the 
completion of this dissertation. Dr. Jim Osborn, Department Head, must be recognized 
V 
also for his financial support and guidance while pursuing my degree at Oklahoma State 
University. 
Gracie Teague must be recognized for her fine secretarial skills and hard work in 
helping me meet deadlines. To all other faculty and staff that I have been associated with 
here in the Department of Agricultural Economics, I am grateful for the quality of 
education and support extended to all students. I believe that you serve as a model of 
higher education and service that others should follow. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Essay Page 
I. INCOME RISK AND WATER QUALITY............................................... 1 
Abstract.................................................................................................... 2 
Introduction ............. ·................................................................................. 4 
Previous Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Safety-First Risk....................................................................................... 7 
Model Specification.................................................................................. 8 
Safety-First and Chance Constraints.......................................................... 9 
Environmental Risk Indices....................................................................... 11 
Study Area, Data, and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Economic Considerations.......................................................................... 16 
Impacts Under Nitrogen Polices................................................................ 16 
Economic Impacts Under Pesticide Policies . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . .. . . . . . . .. . .. . ... . . .. .. . .. ... .. 20 
Nitrogen Policies and Water Quality......................................................... 21 
150 lb. Nitrogen Restriction...................................................................... 21 
Nitrogen Effluent Tax and 30% Nitrogen Tax........................................... 23 
Portfolio Comparison................................................................................ 24 
Chemical Policies and Water Quality......................................................... 26 
Atrazine, Ethyl-Parathion, and Methyl-Parathion Restriction..................... 26 
Chemical Effluent Tax . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . ... . .............. .. . .. . ......... ... . . . . . . . ... . . ... .. 27 
Portfolio Comparison................................................................................ 29 
Policy Implications and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
References................................................................................................ 33 
vii 
Essay Page 
II. PESTICIDE PRODUCTIVITY IN UPLAND COTTON.......................... 41 
Abstract.................................................................................................... 42 
Introduction.............................................................................................. 44 
Production Function and Damage Control Specification............................ 46 
Data Description and Procedure................................................................ 48 
Results...................................................................................................... 56 
Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 
Insecticide Coefficients............................................................................. 58 
Herbicide Coefficients............................................................................... 58 
Direct Inputs.............................................................................................. 60 
Pesticide Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
Insecticides................................................................................................ 60 
Herbicides ............................................ ,................................................... 63 
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
References................................................................................................ 67 
viii 
Essay Page 
III. ABATING SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES IN AGRICULTURE.............. 69 
Abstract.................................................................................................... 70 
Introduction.............................................................................................. 72 
Theory ........... :.......................................................................................... 75 
Theoretical. Comparison............................................................................ 7 6 
Spatially Insensitive Solutions................................................................... 78 
Uniform Charges .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . ... . . .. . .. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 78 
Emissions Permits..................................................................................... 79 
Spatially Sensitive Policies ... :.................................................................... 81 
Land Use Permits..................................................................................... 81 
Spatially Differentiated Taxes.................................................................... 84 
Land Use Permits and Spatial Taxes Compared......................................... 84 
Empirical Application................................................................................ 85 
Area of Study . ... . . . .. ...... ... .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . ..... .......... .. .. ... . . . . . . ... . . . . . ........ .. . . . . . . .. . . . . 86 
Agricultural Production and Cultural Practices.......................................... 87 
Biophysical Model .............. .._.................................................................... 89 
Data Methods and Procedures .................... :............................................. 94 
Simulation Data ................................... ,.................................................... 94 
Return and Cropping Assumptions .. :......................................................... 97 
Soils Data ............................................ ,., ......... :......................................... 100 
Solution Procedure.................................................................................... 102 
Comparing Polices that Reduce Nitrogen Leachate................................... 104 
Baseline.................................................................................................... 104 
Soil Characteristics and Cost of Abatement............................................... 109 
Spatially Differentiated Tax Levels............................................................ 111 
Land Use Permits ............................... :..................................................... 112 
Sub-Watershed Analysis........................................................................... 115 
Costs and Transfers.................................................................................. 118 
Conclusions and Policy Implications......................................................... 118 
Policy Implications..................................................................................... 121 
References................................................................................................. 122 
Appendix A - Example Optimization Model.............................................. 128 
ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
ESSAY I 
INCOME RISK AND WATER QUALITY 
Table 
l. Expected Net Returns and Disaster Income Levels for Unrestricted, 
Nitrogen, and Pesticide Groundwater Policies Under ENR, 25%, 15% 
Page 
and 3 % Risk Preference Levels .................. "................................................. 18 
2. Safety-First Solution Percentage Changes in Estimated Standard 
Deviatiops and Net Returns From Baseline Solutions 
for Nitrogen and Pesticide Water Quality Policies at Selected Risk 
Preference Levels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
3. Mann-Whitney Testfor Comparison ofNitrogen and Chemical 
Environmental Index Distributions under 1501b. Nitrogen Restriction 
Policy............................................................................................................ 22 
4. Mann-Whitney Test for Comparison ofNitrogen and Chemical 
Environmental Index Distributions under Nitrogen Effluent Tax Policy......... 23 
5. Mann-Whitney Test for Comparison ofNitrogen and Chemical 
Environmental Index Distributions under 30% Nitrogen Tax Policy.............. 24 
6. Mann-Whitney Test for Comparison ofNitrogen and Chemical 
Environmental Index Distributions under Atrazine, Ethyl-Parathion, and 
Methy-Parathion Restriction ......................... ,................................................ 27 
7. Mann-Whitney Test for Comparison ofNitrogen and Chemical 
Environmental Index Distributions under Chemical Effluent Tax Policy......... 28 
X 
Table Page 
Appendix Tables for Essay I 
1. Safety-First and Expected Net Returns Unrestricted Farm Plans for 
Alternate Risk Preference Levels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 
2. Safety-First and Expected Net Return Farm Plans for 150 lb. Nitrogen 
Limit Groundwater Policy Under Alternate Risk Preference Levels. . ... . ... . . . . .. 3 7 
3. Safety-First and Expected Net Return Farm Plans Under Atrazine, Ethyl-
Parathion, and Methyl-Parathion, Pesticide Restriction for Alternate Risk 
Preference..................................................................................................... 3 8 
4. Safety-First and Expected Net Return Farm Plans Under A Chemical 
Effluent Tax and Alternate Risk Preferenc.e Levels........................................ 39 
5. . Means and Standard Deviations for Nitrogen and Chemical Environmental 
· Distributions for Alternate Risk Preference Levels and Groundwater 
Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . .. . 40 
ESSAY II 
PESTICIDE PRODUCTIVITY.JN .UPLAND COTTON 
Table Page 
1. Product Name, Active Ingredient, Variable Name, and Frequency of Use 
for Insecticides in the Texas Sample.............................................................. 50 
2. Product Name, Active Ingredient, Variable Name, and Frequency of Use 
for Herbicides in the Texas Sample. .............................................................. 51 
3. Summary Statistics for Insecticide Ingredients Used on Texas Upland 
Cotton.......................................................................................................... 52 
4. Summary Statistics for Herbicides Used on Texas Upland Cotton.................. 53 
5. Summary Statistics for Direct Inputs and Yield, 1994 Texas Upland 
Cotton.......................................................................................................... 53 
6. Nonlinear Least Squares Insecticide Damage Abatement Coefficients and 
Asymptotic Students t-Statistics. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. ..... ................. ... . ... .. . . .. . . .. . . .. .. .. . . . 58 
xi 
Table Page 
7. Nonlinear Least Squares Herbicide Damage Abatement Coefficients and 
Asymptotic Students t-Statistics. ...... .................. .. . .... ... . . . .. ....... .... ... ..... ... .. . . . . 59 
8. Nonlinear Least Squares Direct Input Coefficients, Asymptotic Students 
t-Statistics, and Log Likelihood Value. ......................................................... 60 
9. Marginal Productivity Estimates for Insecticides and Break Even Prices for 
Texas Upland Cotton, 1994. ......................................................................... 62 
10. Marginal Productivity Estimates for Herbicides and Break Even Prices for 
Texas Upland Cotton, 1994. ......................................................................... 64 
ESSAY III 
ABATING SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES IN AGRICULTURE 
Table Page 
\ 1. Notation Summary for Bioeconomic Model.. ..... ,.......................................... 93 
2. Cost, Chemical, Price, Yield, and Net Return Assumptions for Cotton, 
Wheat, Sorghum and Peanuts........................................................................ 97 
3. Land Acreage and Percent of Sub-Watershed............................................... 99 
4. Initial Soil Horizon Textures by Soil Series for Major Cropped Soils in the 
Cobb-Fastrunner Sub-watershed .................................................................... 101 
5. Cropping Percentages, Expected Leachate, and Expected Returns for Base 
Solutions....................................................................................................... 106 
6. Expected Yields and Levels of Nitrogen Applied by Crop and by Soil for 
Base Solutions .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 107 
7. Cost of Abatement and Tax Levels Required to Achieve 20 and 10 Pounds 
of Nitrogen Leachate Per Acre by Soil Series. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 110 
8. Land Use Required for 10 lb. Per Acre ofNitrogen Leachate ........................ 114 
9. Cobb-Fast Runner Sub-Watershed Net Returns Under Land Use Permits, 
Differentiated Taxes, Uniform Standard, and Base Solution Policies. ....... .. . ... 117 
xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
ESSAY I 
INCOME RISK AND WATER QUALITY 
Figure Page 
1. Nitrogen Groundwater Policies Mean-Standard Deviation Efficiency 
Frontiers ................................ ;.: ... -,.-...... _ .... , .......... ,.......................................... 25 
2. Chemical -Groundwater Polices·Mean~Standard Deviation Efficiency 
Frontiers ...................... .-........... :.................................................................... 30 
xiii 
ESSAY I 
INCOME RISK AND WATER QUALITY 
1 
INCOME RISK AND WATER QUALITY 
Abstract, 
The sensitivity of environmental policy conclusions to programming methods is a 
seldom considered topic. Previous research has shown that producer decisions are not 
likely to be ignorant of risk and policy conclusions must be made with this in mind. The 
focus of this research is development of an efficient means of handling risk in the 
examination of environmental policy .. 
A safety-first farm level risk programming model is developed and for sensitivity 
compared with a commonly used linear programming approach Conclusions of 
groundwater quality policies based on these different programming approaches are 
examined. Both economic and environmental impacts are considered. 
. . 
Stochastic net returns are generated using a bio-physical simulation program, 
EPIC.:PST, (Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator, Pesticide Movement Subroutines). 
The EPIC-PST results were entered into a safety-first programming model. A multi-
attribute index of environmental outcomes is used to develop measures of environmental 
risk under the alternate groundwater protection policies being compared. 
The farm plan portfolios under the different groundwater policies differ between 
the risk programming and expected returns approach. The returns were decreased by a 
larger percentage for the risk programming solutions than for the expected returns 
2 
approach. The risk programming model revealed that the variability of returns for the 
respective portfolios increased under the nitrogen effluent tax and both increased and 
decreased under a ethyl-parathion, methyl parathion, atrazine restriction and pesticide 
effluent tax . It was concluded that pesticide leachate polices that were effective at 
lowering groundwater pollution were associated with decreased variability. 
The environmental results fmply that the actual impacts of groundwater protection 
policies under the risk programming approach may not match policy maker's expectations 
under the expected net returns approach. Empirical distributions of the environmental 
indexes show that environmental risk could increase under the chemical effluent tax. 
Likewise, the nitrogen limit ineffective for less risk averse producers. These results imply 
that failure to consider risk could . result in erroneous policy formation. 
Keywords: 
Water - quality, safety-first, income risk. 
3 
INCOME RISK AND WATER QUALITY 
Introduction 
Federal, state, and local concerns in response to groundwater risk from agricultural 
pesticides and nutrients have risen in the past decade. These concerns reflect both the 
continued dependence of producers on agricultural chemicals and their intensity of use. 
For example, in 1986 producers used pesticides on approximately 57% and commercially 
... · 
made fertilizers on 75% of U.S. farms (Office of Technology Assessment). In 1994, 94% 
of all upland cotton received some type of herbicide and 71% received some insecticides 
(USDA-NASS). The presence of and potential for agricultural non-point source pollution 
. ~ . 
(NPS) from these chemicals is well docurhented and as a result these federal, state, and 
local governments are considering policy alternatives to protect groundwater reserves 
(Abdalla and Libby). 
Policies aimed ·at reducing non-point source pollution cari reduce the producers' 
production capability and change income risk. Hence, the producers' production decisions 
in response to a non-point source pollution policy will determine if the intended policy is 
effective in reducing groundwater poHution. The consideration of producer response to 
this change in income risk for non-point source pollution policy formulation is extremely 
weak and in some cases non-existent (Milon). Conversely, researchers have typically 
4 
modeled producer response with linear programming and maximization of expected net 
returns (Jacobs and Cassler; Mapp et al.; Johnson, Adams, and Peny). 
While reducing the potential of NPS pollution might be possible with usage or 
limiting policies, the risk of actual groundwater contamination is very difficult to quantify 
since contamination may depend on a multitude of factors including weather, soil 
characteristics, and production practices. This research builds on previous studies that 
have used bioeconomic simulation to quantify impacts, both environmental and economic, 
in examining groundwater concerns. The overall objective of this study is to develop a 
framework for studying producer risk and the·impacts of risk on the effectiveness of water 
quality policies. 
.- ,· 
A farm level programming model with stochast.ic net returns and a multi-attribute 
environmental index is used to compare the relative farm level economic and 
environmental outcomes' of five groundwater policies. The stochastic net returns for the 
representative farm are generated using EPIC-PST, a bio-physical simulation program, 
and used to model producer income risk. A "safety-first" risk model is developed and 
solved under water quality policies aimed at controlling pollution from pesticides and 
nitrogen. Results from the risk model are compared to the risk neutral maximization of 
expected net return solutions. A number ·Of policies that have been considered in previous 
research are examined here (Teague, Bernardo, and Map; Jacobs and Cassler). 
The policies considered for nitrogen are a per-acre nitrogen restriction, a per 
pound tax on nitrogen, and an effluent tax based on a nitrogen environmental index. The 
chemical policies considered are a selected pesticide ban and an effluent tax based on a 
chemical environmental index. A multi-attribute stochastic environmental index based on 
5 
20-year distributions of environmental outcomes is used to give accurate measures of 
groundwater risk associated with the farm-plans selected. The indexes are an ordinal 
measurement based on percolation, runoff, toxicity, and persistence for different cropping 
systems, nitrogen levels, and pesticide strategies. Correctly identifying the extent of 
environmental impacts by using a multi-attribute measure rather than a single criterion of 
run-off or amount of chemical applied should improve the understanding of the impacts 
on water quality under risk. 
Previous Research 
Policy m~asures aimed at reducing groundwater contamination and their potential 
impacts have been discussed throughout the literature. Mapp et al. considered targeted 
polices versus broad policies for nitrogen on a regional basis. Their study used linear 
programming and maximized average net returns to determine optimal crop production 
and distributions of chemical losses generated by EPIC-PST to quantify probabilities of 
runoff. They compared reductions in regional net returns under alternative water quality 
policies. Anderson, Opaluch, and Sullivan considered reduction and targeted area 
policies to reduce aldicarb in a specific area of Rhode Island, while Jacobs and Casler have 
compared private and social costs of phosphorus reduction under uniform and effluent tax 
policy. Both studies used linear programming. Govindasamy, Cochran, and Buchberger 
compared per acre versus per ton Pigouvian Tax polices for poultry litter application in 
northwest Arkansas, also with linear programming. Teague, Bernardo, and Mapp 
examined expected income reductions under multi-attribute environmental index goals 
consistent with nitrogen and chemical restriction policies. Their study showed that best 
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management strategies could reduce agricultural chemical threats to groundwater and thus 
offer alternatives to direct regulatory policies while maintaining expected returns. 
Producer risk and chemical use has been studied by Olson and Eidman in aM~TAD 
(Minimum of Total Absolute Deviations) formulation with price and yield variation to analyze 
decisions on herbicide use. Current federal and potential changes in policy and their impacts 
on herbicide adoption are examined for a representative farm in Minnesota. Results show that 
reductions in income variability through herbicide use are preferable, at least to the 
representative producer, to higher expected net returns. Archer and Shogren have used a risk 
model to look at the inter and intra substitution of herbicides for weed control decisions. They 
predicted decreased herbicide and fertilizer use for increased probability of herbicide failure that 
resulted in lower levels of non-point pollution under herbicide restriction policies. Johnson, 
Adams, and Perry used bio-economic simulation to assess the on farm impacts of nitrate 
. . . ' . 
reduction. They studied best management practices to achieve lower levels of nitrate pollution 
with less income reduction. 
While research has explicitly considered income risk and water quality separately, 
income risk and its linkages to environmental impacts have not been explored . No studies 
testing the linkage between potential environmental impacts and the consideration of 
income risk were found in the literature. 
Safety First Risk 
Safety-first constraints in income risk analysis have evolved from portfolio risk 
analysis. Safety-first (SF) rules are perceived by researchers as an alternate model of 
7 
decision analysis for the firm. Patrick et al. and others have shown that Kataoka and 
Telser's safety-first rules are likely to be accurate representations of firm decisions. 
Alternately, risk models such as the expected utility model have come under scrutiny as a 
model of producer decision since it is recognized that the independence axiom underlying 
expected utility is often violated (Khaneman and Tversky). 
Under SF rules, the decision maker is assumed to maximize income subject to 
achieving a disaster level of returns a required percentage of the time. As shown by Pyle and 
Turnovsky, the relationship between the expected utility hypothesis and a SF criterion is 
neither direct nor unique. They demonstrated how~ver, that the choice of SF rule is important 
in determining possible correspondence. ··. The SF criterion used in this study can be consistent 
with the expected utility maximization hypothesis~ but will not always produce choice sets 
equal to those under expected utility maximization. Since it is not a true model of expected 
utility maximization, common criticisrns of expected utility cannot be leveled. However, this 
model, as discussed below, maintains some appeal of the expected utility model. 
Model Specification 
Introduced by Charnes and Cooper, have been to model stochastic programming 
problems. Incorporated into safety-first risk programming, chance constraints offer 
alternatives to computationally tractable methods such as MOT AD and Target MOT AD 
(Hazell; Tauer). Safety-first allows for probabilistic interpretation of the results. 
Because net returns are believed to approximate a normally distributed random 
variable and because of the large size of the environmental policy model, a variation of the 
computationally tractable method for linearizing chance constraints first used by Wicks 
8 
and Guise is developed here. The model is modified to solve safety-first rules of income 
risk and utilizes the multi-attribute environmental index developed by Teague, Mapp, and 
Bernardo to account for environmental impacts. 
Safety-Fint and Chance Constraints 
Let the constraint being considered here be 
(l) 
where a is the corresponding level of acceptable risk. Let n j be a normally distributed random 
variable of net returns for the j'th activity, x j, wherex j is the level of the j'th activity. The sum 
(2) .~n.x. ~ J J 
is a normally distributed random variable with mean 7r j and variance a/ . By the 
assumption of normality of returns, constraints or objective functions as given in equation 
( 1) can be formulated. Risk is defined in this model to be the probability of not achieving 
at least some "disaster" level of net returns b, a percent of the time. A model that 
maximizes expected net returns subject to a constraint as defined in equation ( 1) requires 
the decision maker to choose a , the desired level of risk, and the disaster level of income 
b. As proven by Pyle and Turnovsky, using a SF criterion of this type will always result 
in non-feasible expected utility choice sets and maintains little theoretical tractability. 
However, if it is assumed that no riskless cropping choices can be made, the model can be 
reconstructed to avoid this non-feasibility. The model is restructured so that for each risk 
level a, there is a unique disaster level of net returns and expected net returns. Using a 
9 
variation of the model by Wicks and Guise, this chance constraint problem can be 
linearized in the following formulation: 
(3) 
subject to: 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
L1i1Xi ~ 0 
' j 
"2)c1,x1, ~ 0 'v t 
j 
· Lin1,x1, ~ 0 'v t 
j ' ' 
Laiixi ~,.i 
j 
where Dj1 is the negative net return deviations below expected net returns for activity j in 
the t'th period. Net return deviations are transformed into estimators of the standard 
deviation in equation (6) by F, Fisher's constant. This is defined as 
(10) 
.. ' 
F = (PI)T I 2(T- l), 
where Tis the number of periods and PI is the mathematical constant 3.14159. These 
estimates of standard deviation are entered into the objective function via equation ( 4) 
' (Hazell and Norton). Pa is the normal deviate for the desired risk preference level (RPL) 
a. Equations (7) and (8) are accounting rows for the i'th chemical and nitrogen indices 
and j'th activity respectively. Equation (9) is a normal resource constraint where aii is i'th 
IO 
resource requirement for activity j and ri is the i'th restriction. Positivity constraints for 
each activity are included in the model but not listed here. 
This model provides advantages over-Other safety-first specifications and risk 
programming models. By virtue of the model, estimates of.standard deviation are 
minimized and expected returns are maximized as under the Expected Utility approach. 
Also, for a RPL of 50% (~a= 0), the special case of risk neutral Expected Utility 
maximization is implied or maximization of expected net returns. The level of expected 
net returns and estimate of standard deviation for each level of risk is a point on the 
expected utility maximization "opportunity locus" in the mean-standard deviation plane 
(Pyle and Turiiovsky). This locus for each water quality policy traces out an efficiency 
frontier that can be compared in the mean-standard deVIation plane. Also, for each RPL 
assumed, there is a unique disaster level of income· associated with that level of expected 
net returns. This is the lowest level of net returns a producer would be willing to accept at 
that particular RPL level when choosing to maximize expected net returns, which makes 
correlation between producer risk perceptions and producer decisions easier. Further, the 
environmental outcome associated with the level of risk and the res\llting farm plan chosen 
will be unique so that expected net-returns and environmental outcomes can be compared 
under alternate environmental or governmental restrictions. 
Environmental Risk Indices 
The multi-attribute environmental risk indices, equations (7) and (8), used in this 
model follow those developed by Teague, Mapp, and Bernardo. While other indices have 
been developed, these indices are comprehensive indices taking into account both surface 
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and groundwater impacts of agricultural chemicals. The environmental index for 
pesticides is defined as: 
E!Cif= (CPERCifxHA; xPP)+(CRUNOFF:i.xLC; xRP) 
where: 
EiC .. = IJ the environmental index of chemical i for activity j 
the quantity of pesticide i lost in percolation for crop activity j in grams 
per acre. 
CRUNOFF;i = The quantity of pesticide i lost in runoff for crop activity j in grams per acre. 
5 if HAL; :s; 10 or the EPA Carcinogenic Risk Category is A, B, Bl, B2, 
ore 
HA;= 3 if IO< HAL; :s; 200 
1 if HAL; > 200 
HAL; is the Lifetime Health Advisory Level set by EPA for the i'th chemical. 
5 if LC 50 < 1 
LC;= 3ifl:s;LC 50 :s;IO 
I if LC 50 > 10 
LC 50 is the acute toxicity to .fish for 96 hours of exposure. The indices are calculated for 
each chemical applied and summed over ea,ch activity. The index given in equation (7) is: 
n 
lC j = L PlCij 
i=l 
where, 
P Eli is the Chemical Environmental Index for cropping activity j and n is the number of 
chemicals applied on cropping activity j. The nitrogen environmental index in equation (8) 
is defined as: 
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where, 
/NJ= (NPERCJ X PP)+ (NRUNOF~ X RP) 
NEI i = Nitrate Environmental Index for cropping activity j 
NPERC i = the quantity of nitrogen lost in percolation for cropping activity j in 
grams per acre 
NRUNOFFi = the quantity of nitrogen lost in run-off for cropping activity j in 
grams per acre. 
Percolation and runoff in both indices can be weighted by the parameters RP and PP to 
reflect the relative concern for either groundwater or surface water. In this study, 
percolation is weighted more heavily than runoff. PP is set to . 75 and RP is set to .25 in 
both indicies. This reflects the. emphasis on groundwater and the fact that the study area 
has very little surface water of concern. 
Study Area, Data, and Methods 
The area chosen for the representative farm used in this study is the Southern High 
Plains region of the Texas Panhandle. Because of the difficulty of developing an extensive 
set of data that can be utilized to examine farm level environmental impacts, this study 
uses an extension of the data from the 1995 Teague, Bernardo, and Mapp study. This 
data is pre-1996 Farm Bill which relaxed constraints on producer flexibility, however most 
believe that producer response to the increased flexibility will be small. Surveyed 
producers indicated that most would not flex out of 1995 crop mixes due to rotation 
and/or cultural concerns (F APRI, Texas A&M). Further, since income risk and water 
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quality rather management recommendations are the focus of this study, this data is not 
limiting in its policy assumptions. 
The farm was chosen·to include both irrigated and dryland production on a total of 
. 
1280 acres of predominantly Pullman Clay Loam soil. 570 acres are available for irrigated 
production with 250 acres of center pivot sprinkler systems and 320 acres of conventional 
gated pipe furrow systems. For the irrigated acres, continuous rotations of corn, wheat, cotton 
, and grain sorghum were chosen as possible cropping activities. A cotton-wheat kill rotation 
is included for the irrigated cropping situation; wheat is planted after harvesting cotton and 
chemically killed prior to planting cotton in the spring. Dryland cropping activities included 
wheat, wheat-fallow, wheat-grain-fallow, grain sorghum, and cotton .. 
EPIC-PST, a biophysical simulator combining EPIC and the pesticide subroutines 
from the GLEAMS model, simulated crop yi,elds and chemical losses using 20 years of 
weather data for the region (Sabbagh et al.). This model has been applied and tested at 
multiple sites. The cropping situations for irrigated and dryland production included corn, 
cotton, wheat, and grain sorghum. Percolation and runoff from nitrogen, pesticides, and 
herbicides applied were used in the generation of the nitrogen and chemical indices and 
linked to the safety-first model through equations (7) and (8). · 
Over 41 00 cropping activities were generated for a full range of irritation levels, 
nitrogen levels, pesticides, and herbicides applied. Those insecticides and herbicides 
included were based on survey data of area specialists and published chemical data 
(Teague, Bernardo, and Mapp). Because net returns are dependent on the effectiveness of 
fertilizers and pesticides, specific data on the impact of each input on yield is needed. 
EPIC-PST provides specific data on nitrogen inputs but not the yield impacts of 
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insecticides or herbicides. A sutvey of state and area agronomists and entomologists was 
conducted to determine yield reductions from combinations of herbicides and insecticides. 
Those reduction estimates were applied to yields generated by EPIC-PST to give revised yield 
stimates for different cropping activities. These unique yields and resource requirements for 
each cropping activity were used to generate a 20 year stochastic net-return series. The 
stochastic element arises from yield, precipitation, and application of irrigation water, nitrogen, 
and phosphorus. 
The model specified in equations (4) through (10) was solved using LINDO (Linear 
Interactive and Discrete, Optimizer) for nine levels o_f ~a corresponding to the normal deviate 
for the level of desired risk a. Risk is defined as the probability of not achieving at least some 
"disaster" level of net returns at least a percent of the time. Increasing risk preference implies 
that the producer is willing to accept a larger variation in income and thus the possibility of 
- . -- . 
higher expected net returns. The levels of risk preferences chos_en are 3%, 5%, 15%, 20%, 
25%, 30%, 40%, and 50%. As noted, the a=50% corresponds to maximizing expected net 
returns or to a risk neutral Expected Utility approach. The model was solved for these nine risk 
preference levels under the groundwater protection policies of a nitrogen restriction of 150 lbs. 
applied per acre, a 30 percent per pound tax on the level of nitrogen applied, and an effluent 
tax based on the nitrogen environmental index. The pesticide policies considered are a 
restriction on Methyl-Parathion, Ethyl-Parathion, and Atrazine, and a chemical effluent tax 
based on the chemical environmental index. Atrazine poses a dangerous threat to groundwater 
and is being reviewed by the EPA Ethyl and Methyl Parathion are used extensively and have 
been studied by the EPA due to NPS pollution concerns (Holloway; Criswell). 
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For a baseline, the safety-first model was solved with no groundwater polices for each 
RPL. Since each safety-first solution and resulting set of farm plans has an associated set of 
environmental outcomes for each risk preference level, nitrogen and pesticide environmental 
distributions for each policy at selected levels are compared with the unrestricted safety first 
solution using the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test. Since previous studies have used linear 
programming and expected net returns (ENR) to examine water-quality, policy sensitivity is 
developed with comparisons between safety'..first solutions and the ENR solutions. 
The Mann-Whitney (MW) is a ranks test which has reasonable asymptotic relative 
efficiency when compared to the parametric two sample t-test, its parametric counterpart, 
and is considered conservative (Conover). The MW tests whether or not each respective 
environmental distribution is equal to, gr~ater, or less than the unrestricted safety-first 
environmental distributions under the RPL's of 3%,15%, 25%, and ENR. This 
comparison provides an indication of the relative effectiveness of changing the 
environmental distribution at alternate risk preference levels. 
The mean-standard deviation efficiency frontier for each policy is traced out. 
Because solutions represent a point in the Expected Returns - Standard Deviation plane, a 
comparison between policies can determine those which yield farm plan portfolios 
preferred by producers for all risk levels. 
Economic Considerations 
Impacts Under Nitrogen Policies 
A comparison of economic impacts under the safety-first solutions and an expected 
net returns (ENR) solution gives insight into the importance of producer risk in the 
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formation of water quality policies. Table 1 outlines the expected net returns and disaster 
income levels for the ENR approach and selected safety-first risk preference levels for 
each of the nitrogen and pesticide water quality policies. 
Table 1 shows that under ENR, the imposition of nitrogen groundwater policies 
translates into a decrease in expected returns of $35827 for the nitrogen limit, $3538 for 
the nitrogen tax, and $6459 for the nitrogen eflluent tax. These are a 14.48%, 1.43%, and 
2.82% decreases in returns respectively (Table 2). The solutions under ·safety-first show 
that when producer risk is considered,. the resulting impacts from the groundwater policies 
could be greater than estimated under the· ENR solutions. For the 25%, 15%, and 3% risk 
preference levels, the percentage decrease in returns is as great or greater for at least one 
of RPL's than under the ENR solution. 
Of the policies considered, the nitrogen limit prodi!ces the largest percentage 
changes with 16.30%, 16.50%, and· 15.49% decreases in net returns for the 25%, 15% 
and 3% RPL, respectively; all percentage decreases are greater than the ENR solution. At 
the 25% and 15% RPL's, the nitrogen eflluent tax reduced expected net returns a 
maximum of2.74%, which was less than the ENR approach. However, expected net 
returns actually increased by .07% for the 3% risk preference level. Similarly, the nitrogen 
tax decreased net returns by 1.65% at the 25% RPL, which is greater than the reduction 
under the expected net returns solution. The reductions were not larger than the ENR 
approach for the 15% and 3% RPL. 
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Table I. Expected Net Returns and Disaster Income Levels for Unrestricted, Nitrogen, 
and Pesticide Groundwater Policies Under ENR, 25%, 15% and 3% Risk 
Preference Levels. 
Risk Policy Expected Net Disaster Risk Policy Expected Net Disaster 
Level Returns Income Level Level Returns Income Level 
Unrestricted Nitrogen 
Limit 
ENR 247396 247396 ENR 211568 211568 
25% 242694 214344 25% 203111 173276 
15% 236300 200445 15% 197308 158163 
3% 228159 172111 3% 192799 127475 
---------------------------------------------------------Nitrogen Tax Nitrogen 
Effluent Tax 
ENR 243857 243857 ENR 240936 240936 
25% 238670 21088~ 25% 236032 210433 
15% 233055 197199 15% 231161 197701 
3% 224998 168954 3% .. · 228340 172001 
Chemical Chemical 
Restriction Effluent Tax 
ENR 239698 239698 ENR 231390 231390 
25% 233231 207688 25% 223635 197613 
15% 230167 194799 15% 219210 184379 
3% 223041 · 167.193 3% 217426 156020 
The range of disaster income levels for a given policy reflects the level of negative 
net return deviations below the mean; and hence the standard deviation of net returns, for 
the crop portfolio. The lower the level of disaster income, the larger the "confidence 
interval" for a given risk level. Comparing the 3% risk level across the policies, the 
lowest disaster income is associated with the 150 lb. nitrogen limit, and is $65,325 below 
the expected net returns of $192800 When compared with the unrestricted plan which has 
a difference of $56,047, an increase in the deviations of net returns is implied. Table 2 
gives the dollar percentage change in estimated standard deviations under the alternate 
nitrogen policies. For the nitrogen limit, variability in returns is increased and the increase 
is greater under the ENR approach than under the safety-first solutions. Under the 
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nitrogen effluent tax, variability of returns is decreased and the percentage decrease is 
greater for at least one of the safety-first solutions than under ENR. The nitrogen tax 
produces negligible changes in income variability under both ENR and safety first. 
Table 2. Safety-First Solution Percentage Changes in Estimated Standard Deviations and 
Net Returns From Expected Net Returns Solutions for Nitrogen and Pesticide 
Water Quality Policies at Selected Risk Preference Levels. 
Risk Level 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
Standard Deviation 
% Change 
-8.31 
-9.70 
-6.68. 
0.53 
19.82 · 
5.23 
9.16 
16.56 
-0.00 
-1.98 
-0.00 
0.00 
-4.06 
-9.89 
-1.35 
-0.34 
0.14 
-8.20 
-2.85 
9.56 
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Expected Returns 
% Change 
Nitrogen Effluent Tax 
-2.82 
-2.74 
-2.17 
0.07 
Nitrogen Limit 
-14.48 
-16.30 
-16.50 
-15.49 
Nitrogen Tax 
-1.43 
_;1.65 
-1.37 
-l.38 
Chemical Limit 
-3.11 
-3.89 
-2.59 
-2.24 
Chemical Effluent Tax 
-6.46 
-7.85 
-7.23 
-4.70 
The most restrictive policy, the nitrogen limit, is marked by large decreases in net 
returns and increases in variability. The percentage decrease in returns is greater when 
risk is considered then under ENR. If policy formulation is based on the ENR approach, 
then impacts to producers could be underestimated. The same could be said for the 
nitrogen tax. The nitrogen limit is sensitive to th~ model used, while the nitrogen tax is 
less sensitive, and nitrogen effluent tax, at the levels tested, did not display any sensitivity. 
Economic Impacts Vnder Pesticide Policies 
The economic impacts produced, with the pesticide policies .hold many of the same 
implications as the nitrogen polices: For the ENR approach, expected returns were 
decreased by $7697 and $16005.under the pesticide restrfotion and pesticide effluent tax 
respectively. These represerii3 .11 % and 6.46% decreases in expected returns (Table 1 ). 
Compared to the ENR, the percentage decrease is as great as or greater for at least one of 
the risk preference levels. For the pesticide restriction, expected returns were decreased 
by 3.89% at the 25% RPL. When compared to the ENR, net returns were decreased by a 
larger percentage at the 25% and 15% RPL's. 
Changes in the variability of returns are mixed between the pesticide policies. 
Under the pesticide limit, percentage decreases in variability are less than the ENR 
solutions except for the 25% RPL. For the chemical effluent tax, standard deviations 
increase for ENR while falling at the 25% and 15% RPL. However, standard deviations 
increase considerably for safety-first at the 3% RPL. 
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As with the nitrogen polices, there are significant differences for both expected net 
returns and standard deviations under ENR and safety-first. Similarly then, the 
formulation of policy without consideration of risk implies that impacts to producers could 
be underestimated or misestimated. 
Nitrogen Policies and Water Quality 
150 lb. Nitrogen Restriction 
A comparison of the farm plan portfolios under a 150 lb. nitrogen restriction over 
the different levels of income risk preferences and ENR shows that the cropping patterns 
change with respect to the cropping choices, irrigation strategy, level of nitrogen, and the 
pesticide regime. Increasing risk aversion implies decreased levels of corn acreage under 
irrigation which translates into lower levels of water applied to the marginal acres farmed 
. ' ,, 
under irrigation. The acreage devoted to wheat changes over the risk preference levels. 
Wheat-Grain acreage declines from 546 acres under the ENR solution to 67 acres under 
the 15% risk preference level (Appendix Table 2). The total on-farm nitrogen application 
declines from its highest level under the ENR portfolio to the lowest under the 15% RPL 
portfolio. Additionally, the pesticide and herbicide regimes change so that the fewest 
number of pesticides and herbicides are applied under the 15% RPL. These changes 
reflect the.higher penalty associated with deviations below the disaster level of income. 
Table 3 presents the Mann-Whitney tests of the effectiveness ofthe.150 lb. 
nitrogen restriction policy at decreasing the nitrogen and chemical distributions below 
those associated with the unrestricted farm-plan portfolios. Means and standard 
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deviations for the nitrogen and chemical distributions are presented in Appendix Table 5. 
The 150 lb. nitrogen restriction policy was ineffective in reducing the 150 lb. nitrogen 
environmental distributions (NED) below the unrestricted NED for ENR solutions. For 
the safety-first solutions, there was no statistical difference at the 25% RPL. However the 
150 lb. NED's were below the unrestricted NED's at the 15% and 3% RPL's. Changes in 
water quality under the 150 lb. nitrogen restriction did not occur except for more risk 
averse producers and there was no impact for the ENR producer. 
Table 3. Mann-Whitney Test for Coinpari.son ofNitrogen and Chemical Environmental 
Index Distributions under 150 lb. Nitrogen Restriction Policy. 
Risk 
Level 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
Policy Distribution 
150 lb. Nitrogen 
Nitrogen Environnierital 
Limit Distribution 
150 lb. Chemical 
Nitrogen Environmental 
Limit Distribution 
Mann-Whitney 
·statistic 
194 
208 
2482 
2482 
308 
359 
373 
393 
Conclusion1 
unrestri.cted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution> nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution > nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution > chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution > chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution > chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution > chemical distribution 
1 Significant at the 95% confidence level unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Significant at the 90% confidence level. 
The chemical environmental distributions (CED's) associated with the 150 lb. 
nitrogen restriction were below the unrestricted farm plan CED's at all risk preference 
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levels tested and for the ENR solution. This result is due to decreased water application, 
pesticide and herbicide regime changes, and cropping changes. 
Nitrogen Effluent Tax and 30% Nitrogen Tax 
Table 4 presents the statistics and results of the Mann-Whitney Tests of nitrogen 
and pesticide environmental distributions associated with a nitrogen effluent tax and 
Table 5 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney Tests of the nitrogen and pesticide 
environmental distributions under a nitrogen tax. As with the nitrogen effluent tax, the 
30% nitrogen tax was ineffective at decreasing the NED's and CED's below that of the 
unrestricted farm plan for both programming approaches. This reflects the relative price 
inelasticity and high marginal .productivity of fertilizers. 
Table 4. Mann-Whitney Test for Comparison ofNitrogen and Chemical Environmental 
Index Distributions under Nitrogen Effluent Tax: Policy. 
Risk 
Level 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
Policy Distribution 
Nitrogen Nitrogen 
Effluent Tax Environmental 
Distribution 
Nitrogen Chemical . 
Effluent Tax Environmental 
Distribution 
Mann-Whitney 
Statistic 
213 
215 
229 
186 
207 
198 
193 
208 
Conclusion1 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution = chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution =chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution = chemical distribution 
1 Significant at the 95% confidence level unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Significant at the 90% confidence level. 
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Table 5. Mann-Whitney Test for Comparison of Nitrogen and Chemical Environmental 
Index Distributions under 30% Nitrogen Tax Policy. 
Risk Policy Distribution 
Level 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
30% 
Nitrogen 
Tax 
Nitrogen 
Environmental 
Distribution 
30% Chemical 
Nitrogen Environmental 
Tax Distribution 
Mann-Whitney Conclusion1 
Statistic 
200 
201.5 
190 
190.5 
200 
210 
200 
200 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
• unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution = chemical distribution 
. unrestricted distribution =chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution = chemical distribution 
1 Significant at the 95% confidence level unless otherwjse. indicated. 
2 Significant at the 90% confidence level. 
Portfolio Comparison . 
Figure 1 presents the mean-standard deviation :frontiers from the farm plan 
portfolios associated with the nitrogen groundwater policies listed above and the 
unrestricted portfolio. The mean-standard deviation :frontiers associated with the 30% 
nitrogen tax and the nitrogen effluent tax are close to the unrestricted frontier. The most 
restrictive policy is the 150 lb. nitrogen restriction as irlies to the far left of the 
unrestricted mean-standard deviation frontier. Expected net returns are far below the 
unrestricted, 30% tax, and effluent tax groundwater policies. Note that producers are 
heavily penalized even in the cases (ENR and 25% risk preference levels) where no change 
in groundwater quality has been achieved. 
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Figure I. Nitrogen Groundwater Policies Mean-Standard Deviation Efficiency Frontiers. 
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Chemical Polices and Water Quality 
Atrazine, Ethyl-Parathion, and Methyl-Parathion Restriction 
The farm plan portfolios under the Atrazine, Ethyl-Parathion, and Methyl-
Parathion Restrictions reveal that the acreage of cotton-wheat and com remain the same 
over all RPL's considered (Appendix Tab.le 3). The farm plan under the ENR solution is 
identical to the unrestricted farm plan. The level of water applied to furrow irrigated corn 
. . 
declines from 29 acre. inches to 14 acre inches under the 15% RPL. The most significant 
acreage change over the RPL's is the change in the number of acres planted in wheat-
grain-fallow under 25% and 15% levels. The total farm level of nitrogen under the 25% 
level is comparable to the unrestricted farm plan and is greater under the chemical limit 
than under the unrestricted farm plan at the 15% level (Appendix Table 3). For the risk 
programming solutions, the chemical regime changes significantly as the number of 
insecticides and herbicides applied increases over RPL's to reflect the relative aversion to 
risk, while the ENR farm plan reveals nochanges in the number of pesticides applied. 
As shown in Table 6, the Atrazine, Ethyl-Parathion, and Methyl-Parathion 
. . \ 
. . . 
restriction is effective· at reducing the chemical distributions below that of the unrestricted 
chemical distributions at all RPL's tested. The policy had no statistically significant impact 
-on the nitrogen environmental distributions although total farm application of nitrogen 
decreased relative to the unrestricted solution at the 25% RPL and increased at the 15% 
RPL. 
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Table 6. Mann-Whitney Test for Comparison ofNitrogen and Chemical Environmental 
Index Distributions under Atrazine, Ethyl-Parathion, and Methy-Parathion 
Restriction. 
Risk Policy Distribution 
Level 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
Chemical Nitrogen 
Restriction Environmental 
Distribution 
Chemical Chemical 
Restriction Environmental 
Distribution 
Mann-Whitney Conclusion1 
Statistic 
200.2 
185.5 
199.5 
188.5 
325 
374 
385 
395 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution > chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution > chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution > chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution > chemical distribution 
1 Significant at the 95% confidence level unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Significant at the 90% confidence level. 
Chemical Effluent Tax 
A significant amount of acreage is devoted to furrow irrigated ~om under the 
chemical effluent tax groundwater policy. Acreage of furrow com is 282 under all risk 
preference levels considered and ENR. This implies that all available com acreage is 
planted under a furrow irrigation system. The level of water applied to furrow com is 
higher under the 15% ·1evel than under the 25% risk level. Under each RPL, the chemical 
regime changes The 15% RPL has the largest number of pesticides and herbicides 
applied. The total level of nitrogen applied is actually higher under the 15% RPL than the 
unrestricted farm plan under the chemical limit. Under the ENR solution, cotton-wheat is 
produced on 258 acres, which is lower than the unrestricted solution. This is due to the 
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variability in income associated with the rotation. Total farm nitrogen is greater for the 
ENR solution than under the safety-first risk restricted and unrestricted solutions. 
Table 7. Mann-Whitney Test for Comparison ofNitrogen and Chemical Environmental 
Index Distributions under Chemical Effluent Tax Policy. 
Risk Policy Distribution 
Level 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
ENR 
25% 
15% 
3% 
Chemical Nitrogen 
Effluent Tax Environmental 
Distribution 
Chemical Chemical 
Effluent Tax Environmental 
Distribution 
Mann-Whitney Conclusion1 
Statistic 
1512. 
176 
1482 
138 
253 
292 
337 
265 
unrestricted distribution<nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution<nitrogen distribution 
· unrestricted distribution<nitrogen distribution 
unrestricted distribution = chemical distribution 
· ' ·unrestricted distribution>chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution>chemical distribution 
unrestricted distribution>chemical distribution 
1 Significant at the 95% confidence level unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Significant at the 90% confidence level. 
The Mann-Whitney tests of the chemical effluent tax on the chemical and nitrogen 
distributions, as given in Table 7, show that the chemical effluent tax is ineffective at 
reducing the chemical distribution below the unrestricted distribution for the ENR 
solutions. However, it is effective at reducing the distributions for the risk programming 
solutions. Comparing the nitrogen distributions, they statistically greater for the ENR, and 
the 15% and 3% risk preference levels tested. There is no statistical difference in the 
restricted and unrestricted nitrogen distributions at the 25% RPL. In this case, the results 
of the Mann-Whitney distribution tests show that a chemical effluent tax policy under risk 
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programming increases the threat to groundwater from nitrogen at higher risk preference 
levels, but is effective at decreasing the threat from chemicals. The ENR solution shows 
that the chemical effluent policy is effective for both nitrogen and chemical distributions. 
Portfolio Comparison 
The mean-standard deviation frontiers associated with the chemical restriction and 
chemical effluent tax are given in Figure 2. The unrestricted portfolio is the most 
preferred followed by the chemical restriction and chemical effluent policy. The chemical 
restriction and chemical effluent tax provide similar standard deviation trade-offs but these 
deviation trade-offs are greater than under the unrestricted farm plans. 
Policy Implications· and Conclusions 
Income risk at the farm..;level is an aspect of environrriental and water quality 
problems often overlooked in economic studies. This analysis builds on earlier research 
using results from a farm-level risk programming model, stochastic net returns, and a 
multi-attribute environmental index to compare against a typical maximization of expected 
net returns. The sensitivity of farm-level economic and environmental outcomes of several 
groundwater policies are compared for the ENR and risk programming solutions. The 
overall objective of this additional analysis is to develop an efficient means of examining 
income risk, water quality, and the sensitivity of policy formation for the expected returns 
approach versus a risk programming approach. 
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Figure 2. Chemical Groundwater Policies Mean-Standard Deviation Efficiency Frontiers. 
63000 
58000 / 
53000 
,, 
E,4 I 
.g 48000 
c,:t 
! 43000 
'O t 38000 
tlJ 
33000 
/ 
I 
# 
/ 
-
,,, 
. -.,,,,,-
Ill ..... 
.... 
.. ., 
-
,,. 
28000 
23000 
215000 220000 225000 230000 235000 
Expected Net Returns $ 
"" 
"" 
-
-· 
240000 
·, 
-· 
, 
I 
, 
245000 
---- Chemical Restriction - • Chemical Effluent , • · ""' • Unrestricted 
I 
I 
250000 
A safety-first criterion of income risk is constructed so that a maximum disaster 
level of income and corresponding level of expected net returns can be found for multiple 
income risk preference levels. Impacts on expected net returns and water quality are 
compared for a range oflevels. The policies considered for nitrogen are a per-acre 
nitrogen restriction, a per pound tax on nitrogen, and an effluent tax based on a nitrogen 
environmental index. The chemical policies are a selected ban on problematic pesticides 
and an effluent tax based on a chemical environmental index. 
The comparison of the ENR and safety-first criterion produced several interesting 
economic results. The safety-first farm plans produced under the nitrogen and pesticide 
polices show that producers must be penalized heavily to induce changes in water-quality. 
This holds true under the ENR approach as well. However, when compared, the ENR 
approach tends to underestimate the costs to producers to comply with these policies. 
Income variation is 1mpacted negatively under the nitrogen restriction, which is 
unaccounted for in the typical ENR approach, although under the pesticide restriction, 
income variability is actually decreased. 
The environmental implications of this study point to the fact that producers who 
operate under a safety-first criterion may not be susceptible to nitrogen groundwater 
protection policies. Input substitution may negate any attempt at groundwater protection 
as the distributional tests from the 150 lb. nitrogen limit show. 
The chemical policies considered produced similar results. Lower risk preference 
levels under the chemical restriction imply lower chemical environmental distributions. 
The chemical effluent tax was effective at reducing the chemical environmental 
distributions at higher risk preference levels, but actually increased the nitrogen 
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distributions at some risk preference levels contrary to intuition. Contrasted to the ENR 
approach and the policy considered, policy formation could be erroneous. As under the 
chemical effluent tax, it was effective under the risk programming solutions, but not under 
the ENR solutions. The same implications hold for 150 lb. nitrogen limit. 
These results imply that if producers operate under a similar rule such as the 
safety-first rule and risk is not considered, the actual impacts of ground water protection 
policies may not always be directly discernible and care must be taken in implementing 
water quality policies. These findings also have implications for regional or watershed 
analysis. Failure to consider risk preferences over numerous producers could invalidate 
findings or notions of policy effectiveness. 
While these results may be specific to the farm and location studied, other sites 
and other agricultural areas should be modeled to determine the sensitivity of policy to 
income risk. Additional investigation into the connection between the economic and 
environmental impacts of water quality policies under income risk should provide needed 
insight for policy makers considering agricultural non-point source groundwater 
protection policies for ground and surface water. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1. Safety-First and Expected Net Returns Unrestricted Farm Plans for 
Alternate Risk Preference Levels. 
Crop Acres Irrigation 
Strategy 
ENR 
Water 
Applied0 
Nitrogenb Phosphorusb Number of Number of 
Insecticides Herbicides 
-------------------------------------------------------· Cotton-Wheat 288 Furrow 17. 97 26 2 4 
Com 250 Sprinkler 27 209 53 2 1 
Com 32 Furrow 29 223 53 2 1 
Wheat 317 None 26 26 1 1 
Wheat-Grain- 392 None 28 20 3 2 
Fallow 
Total N03 c 107.23 
25% Risk 
-------------------------------------------------------· Cotton-Wheat 288 Furrow 17 97 26 2 4 
Com 250 Sprinkler 27 209 .53 2 1 
Com 32 Furrow· 29 223 53 2 1 
Sorghum 138 None 31 17 2 1 
Wheat 348 None 26 26 1 1 
Wheat-Fallow 150 None 27 27 1 
Wheat-Grain- 72 None 28 20 2 2 
Fallow 
Total N03 c 105.40 
15% Risk 
---------- --------------------------------------------· Cotton-Wheat 288 
Com 250 
Com 32 
Wheat 321 
Wheat-Fallow 228 
Wheat-Grain- 72 
Fallow 
Total N03 c 
a Inches of water applied. 
b Pounds per acre applied. 
Furrow 17 
Sprinkler 27 
Furrow 14 
None 
None 
None 
c Total nitrogen applied in thousand pounds . 
97 26 2 4 
209 53 2 1 
223 53 2 1 
26 26 1 1 
13 13 
28 20 2 2 
98.35 
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Appendix Table 2. Safety-First and Expected Net Return Farm Plans for 150 lb. Nitrogen 
Limit Groundwater Policy Under Alternate Risk Preference Levels. 
Crop Acres Irrigation Water Nitrogenb Phosphorusb Number of Number of 
Strategy Applieda Pesticides Herbicides 
ENR 
Cotton-Wheat 288 Furrow 17 97 26 2 4 
Com 179 Sprinkler 12 119 53 2 1 
Wheat 70 Sprinkler 16 110 53 1 1 
Wheat 32 Furrow 19 110 53 1 1 
Wheat 163 None 26 26 1 1 
Wheat-Grain- 546 None 28 20 3 2 
Fallow 
TotalN03 c 82.39 
25% Risk 
---------------------- --------------------------------· Cotton-Wheat 288 Furrow 17 97. 26 2 4 
Com 221 Sprinkler 12 129 53 2 1 
Com 32 Furrow 14 147 53 2 1 
Sorghum 57 None 31 17 2 1 
Wheat 28 Sprinkler 16 110 53 1 1 
Wheat-Fallow 312 None 13 13 1 
Wheat-Grain- 115 None · .·.28 20 3 2 
Fallow 
Total N03 c 79.87 
----------- ---------------- . ----.-- ----------------· 15% Risk 
Cotton-Wheat 280 · Furrow · i 7 · · 97 · · ·· · · 26 · 2 4 
Com 165 · Sprinkler 12 129 53 2 I 
Com 32 Furrow 14 147 53 2 1 
Wheat 84 Sprinkler 16 110 53 I I 
Wheat 325 None 26 26 1 1 
Wheat-Fallow 30 None 7 7 1 
Wheat-Grain- 67 None 28 20 2 2 
Fallow 
Total N03 ° 74.38 
• Inches of water applied. 
b Pounds per acre applied. 
c Total nitrogen applied in thousand pounds . 
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Appendix Table 3. Safety-First and Expected Net Return Farm Plans Under Atrazine, 
Ethyl-Parathion, and Methyl-Parathion, Pesticide Restriction for 
Alternate Risk Preference Levels. 
Crop Acres Irrigation Water Nitrogenb Phosphorusb Number of Number of 
Strategy Applied• Pesticides Herbicides 
ENR 
Cotton-Wheat 288 Furrow 17 97 26 2 4 
Com 250 Sprinkler 27 209 53 2 I 
Com 32 Furrow 29 223 53 2 I 
Wheat 317 None 26 26 I I 
Wheat-Grain- 392 None 28 20 3 2 
Fallow 
Total N03 c 107.23 
25% Risk 
-----------------------' ·-------------------------------Cotton-Wheat 288 Furrow 17 97 26 2 4 
Com 250 Sprinkler 27 209 53 2 2 
Com 32 Furrow 29 223 53 2 2 
Wheat 215 None 26 26 I I 
Wheat-Fallow , 405 None 6 6 I 
Wheat-Grain- 88 None 28 20 2 
Fallow 
Total N03 c 98.67 
15% Risk . 
Cotton-Wheat 288 Furrow . 17 97 . . . 26 2 4 
Com 250 Sprinkler 27 209 53 2 I 
Com 32 Furrow 14 223 53 2 2 
Wheat 322 None 26 26 I I 
Wheat-Fallow 219 None 6 6 I 
Wheat-Grain- 48 None 28 20 2 
Fallow 
Total N03 c 98.47 
• Inches of water applied. 
b Pounds per acre applied. 
c Total nitrogen applied in thousand pounds. 
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Appendix Table 4. Safety-First and Expected Net Return Fann Plans Under A Chemical 
Effluent Tax and Alternate Risk Preference Levels. 
Crop 
ENR 
Cotton-Wheat 
Cotton-Wheat 
Com 
Wheat 
Wheat-Grain-
Fallow 
Total N03 • 
25% Risk 
Cotton-Wheat 
Cotton-Wheat 
Com 
Wheat 
Wheat-Fallow 
Wheat-Grain-
Fallow 
Total N03 • 
15% Risk 
Cotton-Wheat 
Cotton-Wheat 
Cotton 
Com 
Wheat 
Wheat-Fallow 
Wheat-Grain-
Fallow 
Total N03 • 
Acres Irrigation 
Strategy 
258 Sprinkler 
38 Furrow 
282 furrow 
317 None 
292 None 
258 · Sprinkler 
38 Furrow 
282 ··Furrow 
230 None 
345 None 
133 None 
250 Sprinkler 
32 Furrow, 
5 Furrow 
282 Furrow 
293 None 
279 None 
43 None 
• Inches of water applied. 
b Pounds per acre applied. · 
Water 
Applied• 
15 
17 
29 
15 
i7' 
27 
15 
17 
21 
29 
• Total nitrogen applied in thousand pounds. 
Nitrogenb Phosphorusb Number of Number of 
Pesticides Herbicides 
88 26 2 2 
97 26 2 2 
223 53 2 1 
26 26 1 1 
28 20 3 2 
108.30 
88 26 2 2 
97 26 2 2 
205 53 2 1 
26 26 1 1 
6 6 1 
28 20 2 2 
95.97 
88 '26 2 2 
97 26 2 2 
70 26 2 1 
223 53 2 2 
26 26 1 1 
6 6 
28 20 2 2 
98.95 
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Appendix Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations for Nitrogen and Chemical 
Environmental Distributions for Alternate Risk Preference Levels and 
Groundwater Policies. 
Policy I Distribution RPL8 RPL RPL RPL 
50% 25% 15% 3% 
Unrestricted /NEDb Mean 9378.80 9033.12 8842.60 8121.75 
Std. Devd 4761.70 4595.78 4510.14 4166.44 
Unrestricted I CED0 Mean 6791.92 4921.31 4585.37 4371.84 
Std. Dev 6225.42 3003.38 2862.31 2786.98 
Nitrogen Effluent Tax I NED Mean 8834.52 8482.91 7741.61 8598.03 
Std. Dev 4256.97 4163.78 3718.13 4487.72 
Nitrogen Effluent Tax I CED Mean 6671.77 5003.45 4747.70 4251.69 
Std. Dev· 6171.06. 3105.42 2940.62 2610.46 
Nitrogen Limit I NED Mean 9562.66 .. 8666.53 7965.54 9812.68 
Std. Dev 4565.33 4394.74 3729.91 5068.27 
. ' 
Nitrogen Limit I CED Mean 4225.19 1552.38 1107.10 823.15 
. Std. Dev 7383.34 1752.15 1125.61 536.40 
Nitrogen Tax I NED Mean 9378.80 8951.72 8842.60 8121.82 
Std.-Dev ·4761.79 4526.35 4510.14 4166.47 
Nitrogen Tax I CED Mean 6791.92 4894.73 4585.37 4371.84 
Std. Dev 6225.42 2986.94 2862.31 2786.98 
Chemical Restriction I NED Mean 9378.80 9552.96 8833.65 8294.98 
Std. Dev 4761.79 5082.38 4499.29 4257.29 
Chemical Restriction I CED Mean 2972.81 1120.87 899.33 635.72 
Std. Dev 5260.22 1288.94 807.89 491.24 
Chemical Effluent Tax I NED Mean 14466.68 12430.94 14013.36 13758.81 
Std. Dev 13397.86 11929.04 12942.47 12853.04 
Chemical Effluent Tax I CED Mean 5245.017 2960.85 1910.36 2838.81 
Std. Dev 5977.775 2694.78 1112.63 1289.73 
• Risk preference level. 
b Nitrogen environmental distribution. 
° Chemical environmental distribution. 
d Standard deviation. 
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PESTICIDE PRODUCTIVITY IN UPLAND COTTON 
Abstract 
A yield respons~. function with a damage abatement specification was estimated for 
Texas Upland cotton using data from the USDA, 1994 cropping practices survey. The 
damage abatement specification recognizes the potential bias that can result from 
. . 
aggregate data and seeks to providemsights liito individual chemical productivity. 
Damage abatement sources included were individual ~h~mical compone~ts for all 
herbicides and insecticides applied in the 1994 production season. 
Using commonly applied representative products, cost per pound of active 
. . . - . 
ingredient was derived for each of the components and used to compare economic 
efficiency. Marginal productivity estimates for insecticides ranged from 619 to -17 4 .10 
pounds of cotton lint per acre. These estimates pointed to the fact that some of the 
commonly applied insecticide chemicals dramatically increase yields. For these 
components, when compared with the price at which they are just economically efficient 
(net of application costs), it was found that although marginal productivities were high 
corresponding economic efficiency results were not necessarily so. Further, there were 
many components which were economically effective with low unit costs and high 
marginal productivities which gives credence to producer dependence on insecticides. 
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Herbicide marginal productivity did not truly provide clear answers to producer 
choice as well as insecticides because economic efficiency is determined by exogenous 
elements besides increases in yield such as ginning costs, trash discounts, and cultivation 
costs. Many of the herbicides had, on average, low marginal productivities. Most 
associated prices at which marginal value product equaled marginal costs were greater 
than $10.00 and as high as $293,.00~ which implies poor producer decision. However, 
some marginal productivity estimates pointed to economically efficient application and 
may be better choices for producers depending on the targeted.pest. 
Keywords: 
Pesticide productivity, damage abatement, upland cotton. 
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PESTICIDE PRODUCTIVITY IN UPLAND COTTON 
Introduction 
Agricultural producers, governmental agencies, and the public are concerned about 
the increased use of agricultural chemicals. In 1986, there were approximately 600 active 
ingredients used in some 55 thousand pesticide products, and this trend has continued 
upward (U.S. General Accounting Office). The concern over their extensive use and their 
value to agricultural production are important problems that need to be addressed. 
Arguably, the ability of some agricultural chemicals, such as nitrogen-fertilizer, to 
economically increase output is high, however there is some question as to the economic 
productivity of other chemicals, especially pesticides (Horowitz and Lichtenburg). There 
are some indications that economic productivity of pesticides may be decreasing (Teague 
and Brorsen). 
Most current and past estimates ofpesticide productivity are econometric 
estimates of the contribution of pesticides to the dollar value of output. Headly' s seminal 
paper on insecticide productivity used a Cobb-Douglass specification to derive marginal 
productivity of insecticides for aggregate production data. He concluded that the marginal 
value of contributions were well above their marginal costs. Carlson used the Cobb-
Douglas specification but included pest abundance to address biological resistance and 
falling marginal productivity of insecticides. The importance of the dynamics of 
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agricultural pests and the ability to adapt is addressed. Lichtenberg and Zilbennan have 
studied production functions with damage abatement model specification and have shown 
that functional fonn misspecification can bias productivity estimates upward. Their paper 
extends the weibull, pareto, logistic, and exponential fonns as general fonns of damage 
control. Carrasco-Tauber and Moffitt have estimated a Cobb-Douglas production function 
and the weibull, logistic, and exponential damage control functions with aggregate data 
and compared the resulting marginal productivities. 
While the existing insecticide productivity research has given important insights 
into model specification and gross productivity, most have not addressed specific chemical 
productivity and all have used aggregate data which, as Lichtenberg and Zilbennan note, is 
a potential source of bias. The most recent and only example that uses specific chemical 
data in a pesticide productivity study is Babcock, Lichtenberg, and Zilbennan. Babcock, 
Lichtenberg, and Zilbenrian address quality and quantity damage control with specific 
chemical and production practices data for apple production. However, because 
insecticides are primarily not applied to increase yields but to control quality in apple 
production , their analysis did not include insecticide productivity estimates in increasing 
output. 
Productivity estimates can be used to derive marginal productivity of pesticides. If . 
the estimates of productivity are accurate,· and the conch1sion is that the marginal cost of 
pesticides exceed the marginal value of production, there are important implications. 
First, the potential overuse of agricultural chemicals could imply environmental damage 
that is both unnecessary and inefficient. Secondly, the producer is using inputs in a non-
optimal manner. Existing studies give producers no indication of economic efficiency of 
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individual insecticide use. The use of specific chemical data in an analysis of insecticide 
productivity could provide accurate measures of productivity and useful information for 
management decisions. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The primary goal is to develop measures of 
pesticide productivity with a damage abatement specification for commonly used 
pesticides in upland cotton. With the estimates of chemical productivity, questions of 
economic efficiency can be answered. Secondly, this research seeks to provide producers 
with insights into chemical productivity for pest management decisions. 
Production Function and Damage Control Specification 
Following Lichtenberg and Zilberman, consider a production function of the form 
(1) Y = f(X, A(P)), 
where X is a vector of direct inputs, P is a vector of damage abatement instruments, and 
A(P) is a damage control function which gives the proportion of the destructive capacity 
of a damaging agent eliminated by applying a level of damage control agent P. Assume 
that A(P) can be represented by a cumulative distribution function bounded .at zero and 
one with the following characteristics: A(O) ~ 0 since natural elements can act as damage 
abatement functions, A(P) = 0 implies no abatement, and A(P) = I implies complete 
abatement. 
A specific technology can be represented by a model of the form: 
(2) 
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where I;i is one of j possible direct inputs and f3j is the corresponding coefficient. 
Babcock, Lichtenberg, and Zilberman used the exponential form damage abatement 
because of its fit and ease of estimation. However not all functional forms are amenable to 
estimation of pesticide abatement functions. If the levels of all pesticides used are 
bounded at zero, then abatement function forms such as the exponential or weibull are not 
workable. A form which is tractable is the logistic function because zero bounded values 
of pesticide do not result in functional errors (Evans, Hastings, and Peacock). Because of 
the possibility of zero bounded values, the logistic abatement function will be used in this 
,(. 
research. 
It follows then, if A(P) is logistic, the abatement function can be written as: 
(3) 1 
where b0 is the n'th co~fficient associated with the Pn element ~fthe vector P. 
There has been no statistical r,esearch which has addressed specific chemical use 
and abatement functional form specification. However, in the study by Carrasco-Tauber 
and Moffitt which utilized aggregate data from the Carlson research, they found that the 
exponential form of the abatement function produced the lowest estimates of marginal 
pesticide productivity while the Weibull and logistic distributions produced higher 
estimates of marginal productivity and were comparable to the Cobb-Douglass 
specification. The Akaike criterion, a statistical measure used to compare functional 
specifications, gave no strong theoretical or econometric reason to choose one of these 
damage control specifications over another. 
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Data Description and Procedure 
Primary data on chemical usage was obtained from the "USDA, 1994 Cropping 
Practices Survey, Unofficial data files", Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Washington D.C. This data set is a comprehensive research database 
developed to analyze production inputs, tillage practices, and chemical application 
associated with production crops in major producing states. Data on chemical application, 
production practices am drawn from surveyed producers to provide information on on-
farm and off-farm environmental issues associated with agricultural chemical use (USDA-
NASS). Specifically, the data set includes such items as yields, fertilizers applied, 
machinery complements, and chemical. inp,uts. Chemical inputs are given both as label 
names and major active components .of the label names. For cotton production, it contains 
sample information on the major upland cotton producing states of Arizona, Arkansas, 
. . . 
California, Louisiana, Missouri, and Texas. 
U.S. cotton production is marked by intensive use of both fertilizers and chemicals. 
Modem production requires application of both herbicides and insecticides to obtain high 
yields. In 1994, 94% of all upland cotton received some type ofh~rbicide and 71% 
received some insecticide. 
For this study, a subset of Texas upland cotton producers was chosen because 
Texas plants over 50% of upland cotton in the United States. Herbicides and insecticides 
were applied to over 96% and 50% respectively of upland cotton acreage in Texas in 1994 
(NASS-USDA). Data from 1994 was chosen because the 1995 cotton producing season 
was marked by relatively high applications of insecticides due to large infestations of army 
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beetworms throughout the state and would not provide reliable estimates (1996 
Proceedings Beltwide Cotton Conferences). Data for the 1996 production season were 
not available at the time this research was conducted. Information on a total of 507 
producers throughout the state was available in the production practice survey. Further, 
since production practices, planting dates, insecticide application, types of pesticides 
applied, insect types, and insect populations vary from state to state, and possibly region 
to region, inclusion of all cross sectional data from all states could increase econometric 
problems and thus reliability of the estimates. 
Tables 1 and 2 give major insecticide and herbicide brand names, ingredients, 
variable names, ~nd number of times the component appeared in the Texas sample. These 
components correspond to primary ingredients of all major insecticide and herbicide 
products applied in the 1994 Texas production season and are the elements of a 
insecticide damage abatement vector, say P, as above, and a herbicide damage abatement 
vector, say H. The only insecticide not included in this study was Bacillus - Thuringiensic 
(Bt. ), which is a commonly used biological insecticide. Numerous reporting errors would 
not allow its inclusion. 
Because agricultural producers may apply chemical components more than once 
per season to maintain control of insects and weeds, especially in cotton production, 
chemical quantities were summed by component for each sample after conversion to equal 
units (i.e. pounds per acre). The variables pl-p28 and hl-hl 7 reflect total pounds per 
acre of primary insecticide and herbicide ingredients applied in the 1994 season. Table 1 
reveals that the three most frequently used insecticides are azinphos-methyl, methyl-
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parathion, and aldicarb, while trifluralin, prometryn, and glyphosate are the three most 
frequently used herbicides. 
Table 1. Product Name, Active Ingredient, Variable Name, and Frequency of Use for 
Insecticides in the Texas Sample. 
Representative Product' Active Ingredient · Variable Naine Frequencyb,c 
Dimethoate 4EC Dimethoate p2 6 
Bidrin 8 Dicrotophos p3 43 
Methyl Parathion 4EC Methyl-Parathion p4 46 
PCNB 2E PCNB p5 5 
Sevin XLR Plus ( 4E) Carbyrl p6 7 
Thimet 20-G Phorate p7 28 
Cytion UL V (9.33) Malathion p8 10 
Guthion 2L Azinphos-Methyl · p9 56 
Thiodat 3EC Endosulfan plO 10 
Terraclor Super X Etridiazble pll 4 
Lannate L V (2:4) Methomyl p12 5 
Furadan 4F Carbofuan p13 35 
Comite (6.55EC) Propargite pl4 5 
Temic 15-G . Aldicarb pl5 45 
Orthene 90S Acephate p16 25 
Vydate C-LV (3.77) Oxamyl p17 39 
Counter 20CR Terbufos pl8 3 
Dimlin 2F Diflubenzuron pl9 9 
Asana XL ( .66EC) Esfenvalerate p20 11 
Ammo 2.5 EC Cypermethrin p21 19 
Curacron 8E Profenofos p22 18 
Larvin 3.2 Thidocarb p23 9 
Scout X-TRA (.91 EC) Tralomethrin p24 14 
Capture 2EC Bifenthrin p25 6 
Baythroid 2 (EC) Cyflutrin p26 6 
Karate (1 EC) Lambda-Cyhalothrin p27 43 
Fury 1.5 EC Zeta-Cypermetrin p28 5 
a Product names correspond with the product for which prices were solicited and used to 
estimate unit cost per pound in 1994 prices. 
h Number of times ingredient was applied at least once by a producer. 
c 507 producers in survey. 
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Table 2. Product Name, Active Ingredient, Variable Name, and Frequency of Use for 
Herbicides in the Texas Sample. 
Representative Product Active Ingredient Variable Name Frequencyb,c 
MSMA 6.6 Plus H.C. MSMA hl 18 
Banvel 4L Dicamba h2 4 
Weedar MCP A Concentrate ( 4E) MCPA h3 2 
Cotoran 4L Fluometuron h4 25 
Direx 4L Diuron h5 41 
Linex 41 Linuron h6 10 
Treflan EC Trifluralin h7 311 
Caparol 4L Prometryn · h8 108 
Bladex 4L Cyanazine h9 10 
Roundup Ultra Glyphospate hlO 98 
Solicam DF 80% Norflurazon hll 13 
Prowl 3.3 EC Pendamenthalin h12 74 
Poast Plus (IEC) · Sethoxydim h13 2 
Fusilade DX · Fluaxifop-P-butyl h14 19 
Command4EC Clomazone hl5 17 
Fusion F enaxaprop-ethyl h16 4 
Assurre II Quizalofop-ethyl h17 3 
• Product names correspond with the product for which prices were solicited and used to 
estimate unit costs. 
b Number oftimes ingredient was applied at least once by a producer. 
c 507 producers in survey. 
The summary statistics for insecticides ingredients, herbicides ingredients, and 
direct inputs are given in Tables 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Note that all the chemicals 
considered have a minimal value of zero. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Insecticide Ingredients Used on Texas Upland Cotton. 
Active Ingredient Meanb M . b axtmum Standard Deviationb 
BT 
Dimethoate .0034 0.50 .0323 
Dicrotophos .0412 1.50 .1526 
Methyl-Parathion .1918 4.21 .6718 
PCNB .0053 1.00 .0527 
Carbyrl .0018 0.75 .0369 
Phorate .0394 0.80 .1519 
Malathion .1056 5.83 .7308 
Azinphos-Methy .0665 2.22 .2127 
Endosulfan .0100 0.60 .0650 
Etridiazole .00.07 0.07 .0073 
Methomyl .0057 0.60 .0544 
Carbofuan .0265 0.75 .1104 
Propargite .0029 1.22 .0605 
Aldicarb .0619 1.35 .2058 
Acephate .0250 0.90 .1228 
Ox amyl .0469 2.82 .2146 
Terbufos .0034 0.60 . .0431 
Diflubenzuron .0001 0.06 .3079 
Esfenvalerate .0010 0.08 .0068 
Cypermethrin .0009 0.11 .0067 
Profenofos .0819 4.00 .5004 
Thidocarb .0142 1.00 .1058 
Tralomethrin .0010 0.06 .0065 
Bifenthrin · .0010 0.08 .0088 
Cyflutrin .0006 0.07 .0055 
Lambda-Cyhalothrin .0056 0.12 .0194 
Zeta-Cypermetrin .0004 0.04 .0043 
a All ingredients had a minimum value of zero. 
b Reported in pounds of active ingredients used per acre. 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for Herbicides Used on Texas Upland Cotton. 
Active Ingredient Meanb Maximumb Standard Deviationb 
MSMA 0.0667 4.50 0.4216 
Dicamba 0.0030 0.12 0.0065 
MCPA 0.0048 1.00 0.0695 
Fluometuron 0.0914 7.50 0.6566 
Diuron 0.0473 .2.40 0.1854 
Linuron 0.0006 0.25 0.0123 
Trifluralin .05779 2.25 0.4146 
Prometryn 0.1963 2.00 0.3711 
Cyanazine 0.0185 4.00 0.2060 
Glyphosate 0.1554 2.88 0.3644 
Norflurazon 0.0137 0.80 0.0878 
Pendamenthalin 0.1272 2.00 0.2979 
Sethoxydim 0.0009 
--·· 
0.18 0.0130 
Fluaxifop-P-Butyl 0.0063 0.59 0.0390 
Clomazone 0.0167 · 1.20 0.1002 
F enaxaprop-ethyl 0.0034 0.07 0.0048 
Quizalofop-ethyl 0.0036 0.05 0.0042 
a All ingredients had a minimum value of zero. 
b Reported in pounds of active ingredients used per acre. 
Table 5. Summary Statistics for Direct Inputs and Yield, 1994 Texas Upland Cotton. 
Direct Input Variable Mean 
Yield a XI 490.83 
Nitrogenb X2 56.42 
Phosphorusc XJ 25.05 
Potassiumd . X4 6.14 
Irrigatione Xs 
• Pounds of lint per acre. 
b Pounds of actual nitrogen per acre. 
c Pounds of actual phosphorus per acre. 
d Pounds of actual potassium per acre. 
Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation 
2665.70 18.04 358.15 
441.00 0.00 62.52 
118.00 0.00 26.08 
81.00 0.00 13.24 
2.71 1.00 
e Defined as a binary variable: 2. 718 = use of irrigation, 1 = no irrigation. 
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Equations (2) and (3) provide a production function technology that incorporates 
damage abatement. This specification does not consider different sources of damage and 
alternate damage·abatement for these sources. An example of this would be the sources 
of damage from insects and weeds. A first order logarithmic approximation of equation 
(2) with damage abatement functions for both herbicides and insecticides gives, 
(4) y=a+ LP1z1 +ofo[G(P,H)] +e 
j 
where there are j direct inputs, y, a and ·x represent the natural logs ofY,a. and X 
respectively and Eis assumed to be a N(O,crl) error term. The function G(P,H) is: 
(5) 
•[l + exp(µ 1~ Lb. p ·)]··[l + exp(µ 1- L q· h )] ' 
I .. nn . 2 mm 
.. n · ' m 
which implicitly requires the assumption of indeperid'ence between control of damage from 
insects and weeds. The variables b0 and p0 are as defined earlierbut apply to n insecticides 
and similarly, the variables qm and hm apply tom herbicides. The variable Bis the 
proportional relation between yield arid damage abatement. 
For identification, the restriction B = 1 is imposed.on equation (4). This 
assumption requires that abatement be proportional to potential output (Carrasco-Tauber, 
Catalina, and Moffit). Equation (4) is nonlinear in the abatement function and 
necessitates estimation by a non-linear method. 
Accuracy of estimates in nonlinear least squares is dependent on the classical 
assumptions of normality of the error terms and homoskedasticity. These null hypotheses are 
tested using the Jarque-Bera test for normality and procedures recommended by McGuirk, 
Driscoll, and Alwang for testing the hypothesis of homoskedasticity (McGuirk, Driscoll, and 
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Alwang; White). Fragility ofresults resulting from a local solution with a nonlinear least 
squares algorithm was minimized by using multiple starting values and comparing the estimates 
against other starting values that achieved convergence. All estimation and pretesting was 
done with the SHAZAM econometrics software package (White). 
Carlson, and Moffitt and Farnsworth have considered insecticide productivity in 
relation to insect resistance. While insecticide productivity and resistance are linked, insecticide 
resistance is not considered in this study. Interactions between insecticide components and the 
order in which the components are applied are assumed to be non-significant. This assumption 
relies on the fact that producers are often aware of the implications of applying more effective 
chemicals such as pyrethrins early in the season and the possibility of a decrease in effectiveness 
due to increased resistance in later pest populations (J.C. Banks). Additionally, it is assumed 
that expensive chemicals which are considered to be more effective, are not applied until pest 
populations are eitheruncontrollable (or perceived as uncontrollable) with less expensive 
insecticides or as a "last ditch effort". Resistance to herbicides is not a concern since this is a 
cross-sectional sample and herbicide resistance by weeds is a considered a longer term problem 
(Archer and Shogren). 
The marginal productivities for the n'th insecticide or m'th herbicide can be found 
by the partial derivative of equation ( 4) with respect to each chemical component. These 
can be written as: 
for insecticides, and 
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(7) [ 
-q ·exp(m - Lq h )-q •exp(m +m - Lb p - Lq h ) J oy m 2 mm m I 2 nn mm 
oh = l+exp(m - Lb p )+:xp(m - Lq h )+exp(m :m - L~ p - Lq h ) 
n I nn 2 nm I 2 nn mm 
n m n m 
for herbicides. Ifuriit prices of then insecticides and m herbicides along with the unit 
price of yield are known, a marginal value of production can be obtained and compared 
with the marginal cost associated with the pesticide inputs. 
Results 
Estimation 
Nonlinear least squares estimation converged in approximately 200 iterations for 
all starting values. and the differences in estimated coefficients were small. Since 
convergence did not produce identical estimated coefficients, the starting value that gave 
the largest log likelihood value was chosen. 
For the starting value chosen, the Jarque-Bera test failed to reject the hypothesis 
of normal error terms at the significance level of a=.005 with a test statistic x~ - 8.37. 
The reset test for homoskedasticity rejected the null of homoskedasticity at the 
significance level of a=.01 with a test statistic t - 3.792. The null hypothesis of zero 
coefficients was easily rejected using the Likelihood Ratio Test with a test statistic of 
LR= 435.35 and a=.005 (Judge et al.). 
Since apriori no specific form ofheteroskedasticity was known, the finding of 
heteroskedasticity was accommodated by correcting the covariance matrix using 
procedures recommended by White. The covariance matrix estimated is: 
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(8) 
where X1 is a vector of instrumental variables and ei is the error term for the t'th 
observation estimated using two stage least squares. The instrumental variables used in X1 
are all the direct and damage abating inputs (White). 
Insecticide Coefficients 
Non-linear least squares estimates and asymptotic t-statistics for the insecticide 
coefficients specified in (4) are given in Tables 6. Seventeen of the variables were found to be 
significantly greater than zero starting with the significance level of a=.20. Eight of the 
seventeen were found to be highly significant at the level of a=. 05. Dimethoate, propargite, 
and cyflutrin had large estimated coefficients with respect to the other chemicals considered. 
However, only dimethoate was found to be statistically significant. The signs for most of the 
coefficients conform to expected sign since the coefficients are required to be negative for a 
positive marginal productivity. Six of the coefficients had positive coefficients. 
The cause of positive coefficients cannot be determined. However, positive 
coefficients, and thus negative chemical productivity estimates, may result from the failure to 
completely control a pest population or from an increase in pressure from secondary pests 
caused by decreased beneficial populations (J.C. Banks). Because pest populations are not 
known, it is assumed here that producers are applying the insecticides at or before pest 
populations are uncontrollable. Failure to do so by the producer does not invalidate the 
productivity estimates however, because empirically, damage is not being abated by these 
chemicals indicating that on average some other insecticide should have been utilized. 
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Table 6. Nonlinear Least Squares Insecticide Damage Abatement Coefficients and 
Asymptotic Students t-Statistics. 
Variable 
Constant 
Dimethoate 
Dicrotophos 
Methyl-Parathion 
PCNB 
Carbyrl 
Phorate 
Malathion 
Azinphos-Methyl 
Endosulfan 
Etridiazole 
Methomyl 
Carbofuan 
Propargite 
Aldicarb 
Acephate 
Oxamyl 
Terbufos 
Diflubenzuron 
Esfenvalerate 
Cypermethrin 
Profenofos 
Thidocarb 
Tralomethrin 
Bifenthrin 
Cyflutrin 
Lambda-Cyhalothrin 
Zeta-Cypermetrin 
••• Significant atthe cx.:=,.05 level. 
•• Significant at the cx.=.10 level. 
• Significant at the cx.=.20 level. 
Herbicide Coefficients 
Coefficient 
-.23 
-148.21 
-6.20 
-.64 
-110.73 
-54:18 
-.12 
-.06 
-1.64 
-72.05 
-29.33 
-1.39 
-11.10 
-97.90 
.50 
-4.14 
-28.18 
-32.35 
-10.48 
-10.25 
3.42 
2.08 
.49 
-26.16 
52.30 
-119.53 
-29.73 
41.63 
Asymptotic t-Statistic 
-1.33" 
-2.09000 
-1.47" 
-.97 
-2.59°00 
-2.59000 
-.24 
.26 
-1.56" 
-1.49" 
-2.56°00 
-.41 
-1.83°0 
-.95 
l.8600 
-.71 
-1.81 00 
-2.31°0 • 
-2.21··· 
-.39 
.34 
5.21 000 
.23 
-.53 
1.61" 
-.46 
-1.31" 
2.46000 
The estimated coefficients for the herbicides are listed in Table 7. Eight of the 
estimated coefficients were significant atleast at the level of cx.=.20 with five of the eight 
significant at the level of cx.=.05. Interestingly, the signs of the coefficients do not necessarily 
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confonn to the expected. Ten of the seventeen herbicide components considered are positive, 
which results in negative marginal productivity. The explanation for this arises out of the 
producers need to control weed predator populations to increase yield as well as to keep 
cotton plants free of weeds (Communication with producers; Tom Green, Concho, and 
Runnels County, Texas). Failure to control weed populations could result in high ginning costs 
as well as lowered quality of cotton and thus price received. Hence, producers may be willing 
to trade some cotton yield for weed control. The existence of negative marginal productivity 
does not necessarily translate into inefficient input choices. 
Table 7. Nonlinear Least Squares Herbicide Damage Abatement Coefficients and 
Asymptotic Students t-Statistics. 
Variable Coefficient Asymptotic t-Statistic 
Constant -1.14 -2.11··· 
MSMA 1.51 2.42 ... 
Dicamba -5.21 -.21 
MCPA .94 1.08 
Fluometuron -50.29 -1.97 ... 
Diuron .56 .94 
Linuron 4.23 1.3 I· 
Trifluralin -.67 -.16 
Prometryn . 82 1.96 ... 
Cyana.zine .27 1.32· 
Glyphosate . 62 3.28 ... 
N orflurazon .43. .28 
Pendamenthalin -1.36 -1.03 
Sethoxydim 3.37 .49 
Fluaxifop-P-Butyl -.52 -.14 
Clomazone -7.63 -.50 
F enaxaprop-ethyl 20.05 1.63· 
Quizalofop-ethyl -331.74 -1.07 
••• Significant at the cx=.05 level. 
•• Significant at the ex= .10 level. 
. Significant at the cx=.20 level. 
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Direct Inputs 
The estimates for the direct inputs are listed in Table 8. All signs are positive as 
expected and the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. Note that each of the 
coefficients is scaled. Nitrogen is estimated so that each unit is 50 pounds, Phosphorus 
and Potassium are in IO pound units. Also, cotton lint yield is in 500 pound units and all 
are on a per acre basis. 
Table 8. Nonlinear Least Squares Direct Input Coefficients, Asymptotic Students t-
Statistics, and Log Likelihood Value. 
Variable 
Constant 
Nitrogen a 
Phosphorusb 
Potassiumc 
Irrigationd 
Log Likelihood 
Coefficient 
.17431 
.06931 
.05597 
.04116 
. 88170 
-275.91 
Asymptotic t-Statistic 
1.71"" 
3_34•oo 
2.92·00 
1.74•• 
15.14 ... 
a Increase in 500 lbs. oflint increase per 50 lb. increase in actual nitrogen applied. 
b Increase in 500 lbs. of lint increase per 10 lb. increase in actual phosphorus applied. 
c Increase in 500 lbs. oflint increase per 10 lb. increase in actual potassium applied. 
d Increase in 500 lbs. of lint increase for use of irrigation. 
Pesticide Productivity 
Insecticides 
Marginal productivity estimates for insecticides range from a high of 619. 79 
pounds of lint per acre for dimethoate to a low of -17 4 .10 for zeta-cypermetrin indicating 
the ability of insecticides to marginally impact yields positively as well as the inability of 
insecticides to control pest populations (Table 9). Of the three most frequently used 
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insecticides, the marginal productivity estimates are either low, negative, or the 
coefficients were not significant. Estimated marginal productivity for azinphos-methyl is 
only 6.87 pounds oflint per acre for each pound of active ingredient applied while methyl-
Parathion, although insignificant, has a marginal productivity of2.68 pounds of lint pe~ 
acre. aldicarb, the most frequently applied insecticide ingredient, did not have a positive 
marginal productivity. Dicrotophos and lambda-cyhalothrin, both heavily applied, had 
marginal productivities of25.96 and 174.19 respectively: 
Using cost per pound of active ingredient and estimated marginal productivity, the 
price per pound of cotton lint at which marginal value product and marginal cost is equal are 
estimated for the insecticide components (denoted as a break even price) and listed in Table 9. 
Note that these prices do not include application costs because application costs can vary from 
$1. 50 to $5. 00 per acre depending on the type of application .. Inclusion of application costs 
would increase break even prices for all products considered. Thus pesticides with break even 
prices close to or at market price would not likely be economically efficient. 
For the sixteen insecticides that had significant coefficients, ten had break even prices 
below $.65 per pound oflint, or below U.S. market average price for 1994 (UDSA-NASS). 
For those with high marginal productive and low unit prices, such as dimethoate, PCNB, and 
carbaryL the break even price is less than 3 cents($ .03) per pound which indicates relatively 
high economic efficiency. Conversely, three of the insecticides with significant coefficients, 
azinphos-methyl, lambda-cyhalothrin, and diflubenzuron have break even prices greater than 
$2.00 which exceeds average market prices by greater than 200%. Insecticides such as 
phorate, malathion, and esfenvalerate, which were not found to be statistically significant in 
changing lint yield, had break even prices exceeding $4.00 and as high as $18.00. Note that 
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esfenvalerate increased yields by greater than 40 lbs of lint per acre, but high marginal costs 
($209/lb) make application inefficient at that level of productivity. 
Table 9. Marginal Productivity Estimates for Insecticides and Break Even Prices for 
Texas Upland Cotton, 1994. 
Active Ingredient Marginal Productivity8 Cost Per Poundb Break Even Pricec 
Dimethoate 619.79·. $ 7.56 $.01 
Dicrotophos 25.96""" $ 11.13 $.42 
Methyl-Parathion 2.68 $ 6.25 $ 2.33 
PCNB 463.06""" $ 9.37 $.02 
Carbary! 226.58""" $ 6.29 $.02 
Phorate .51 $ 9.65 $ 18.79 
Malathion .26 $ 2.70 $ 10.07 
Azinphos-Methyl 6.87" $ 16.65 $ 2.42 
Endosulfan 301.33" $ 12.33 $.04 
Etridiazole 122.69""~ $ 34.97 $.28 
Methomyl 5.825 $ 20.16 $ 3.46 
Carbofuan 46.44"" $ 16.50 $.35 
Propargite 409.4 $ 8.85 $.02 
Aldicarb -2.10"" $ 21.00· 
Acephate 17.32 ·s 11.n $.64 
Oxamyl 117.80"" $ 16.63 $.14 
Terbufos 135_30··· $ 12.00. $.08 
Diflubenzuron 43.85··· $ 97.50 $ 2.01 
Esfenvalerate 42.87 $ 209.09 $ 4.87 
Cypermethrin -14.30 $ 96.80 
Profenofos -8.72""" $ 13.62 
Thidocarb -2.08 $ 16.75 
Tralomethrin ·• 109.40 $331.11 $ 3.02 
Bifenthrin -218.70" $ 246.00 
Cyflutnn 499.88 $ 231.00 $.46 
Lambda-Cyhalothrin 124.32" $ 258.00 $ 2.07 
Zeta-Cypermetrin -174.10""" $ 200.66 
• Marginal productivity in pounds of lint per acre per pound of active ingredient. 
b Derived from products reported in Table 1 and in 1994 prices. 
c Dollars per pound of lint at which MC=MVP; does not include application costs. 
••• Corresponding estimated coefficient significant at the a=.05 level. 
•• Corresponding estimated coefficient significant at the a=. l O level. 
• Corresponding estimated coefficient significant at the a=.20 level. 
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Herbicides 
A significant number of herbicide coefficients, as noted, are positive and thus have 
negative estimated marginal productivity. However, these negative marginal 
productivities are small and range from -7.72 to -.30 pounds of lint per acre, or $5.01 to 
$.46 in lost lint value if cotton lint is valued at $.65 per pound {Table 10). In terms of 
economic efficiency, this may be a small tradeofffor costs associated with a low grade 
cotton, which could be discounted as much as 7. 8 cents per pound (Plains Cotton 
Cooperative Association). For the herbicides with significant coefficients, estimated 
marginal productivities are as high as 127.71 pounds of lint per acre to a low of .20 
pounds of lint. Of these, fluometuron and quizal,ofop'."ethyl have break even prices below 
the $.65 average lint price, while others have break even prices that are as great as 
$293.08. tritluralin, the most often applied herbicide had a break even price of $28.05. 
As with insecticides; these break even prices do not include application costs. Although 
the break even prices are high for some of the herbicides, positive statements about the 
economic efficiency. Break even price does not encompass the loss associated with poor 
quality cotton with higher weed populations or increased cultivation costs. If cultivation 
costs are on average valued at $5.00 per acre per trip, then the economic implications may 
be different if the number of cultivation trips are decreased by as few as two. However, it 
is not likely that costs savings and increased value will ever equate to a break even price of 
$293.08 such as that for fluaxifop-p-butyl. 
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Table 10. Marginal Productivity Estimates for Herbicides and Break Even Prices for 
Texas Upland Cotton, 1994. 
Active Ingredient Marginal Productivitya Cost Per Poundb Break Even Pricec 
MSMA -.58··· 
Dicamba 2.00 
MCPA -.36 
Fluometuron 19.36""" 
Diuron -.21 . 
Linuron -1.62" 
Trifluralin .25 
Prometryn -.31 ... 
Cyanazine -.10· 
Glyphosate -.24 ... 
Norflurazon -.16 
Pendamenthalin .52 
Sethoxydim -1.30 
Fluaxifop-P-butyl .20 
Clomazone 2.39 
F enaxaprop-ethyl -7.72" 
Quizalofop-ethyl 127,71 . 
$ 3.03 
$ 29.50 
$ 3.75 
$ 5.70 
$ 5.75 
$ 22.00 
$ 7,.25 
$ 8.10 
$ 7.38 
$ 12.95 
$ 12.80 
$ 7.81 
$ 50.65 
$ 59.35 
$ 20.50 
$ 65.00 
$ 59.35 
$ 14.68 
$.29 
$ 28.05 
$ 14.88 
$ 293.08 
$ 8.56 
$ .46 
a Marginal productivity in pounds of lint per acre per pound. of active ingredient. 
b Derived from products reported in Table 2. 
cDollars per pound of lint at which MC=MVP; does not include application costs. 
••• Corresponding estimated coefficient significant at the a.=.05 level. 
•• Corresponding estimated coefficient significant.at the a.=.10 level. 
• Corresponding estimated coefficient significant at the a.=.20 level. 
Discussion 
The marginal productivity estimates obtained from the yield response function and 
damage abatement specification show the appeal of chemical input use to producers . The 
ability to increase yields in excess of 500 pounds of lint per acre, or approximately one 
bale, as with dimethoate, makes obvious why cotton producers heavily apply insecticides. 
Interestingly however, is that those chemicals applied most :frequently were most likely to 
have small marginal productivities relative to the costs per. unit of active ingredient, which 
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results in marginal costs greatly exceeding marginal value product. Examples include 
esfenvalerate, lambda-cyhalothrin, and zeta-cypermethrin. Conversely, there are a number 
of insecticides that have low unit costs and high marginal productivities such as cyfluthrin, 
etridiazole, and endosulfan, and may be a better economic alternative for producers. 
While similar statements can be made about herbicides, it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about producer decisions except to say that there are those chemicals that are 
not likely to be economically efficient. Components such as fluaxifop-p-butyl that cost 
$59.35 per unit but only increase yields by .20 pounds per acre are unlikely to be a wise 
producer choice. Chemicals like trifluralin in popular pre-emergent herbicides like Treflan 
do not have a significant impact directly on yield. However, the economic incentives exist 
because ofincreased weed control, lowered cultivation costs, and better lint quality. 
These incentives are difficult to quantify with .the marginal value product and marginal 
cost measures. 
Conclusions 
A yield response function with a damage abatement specification was estimated for 
Texas Upland cotton producers. Damage abatement sources included were herbicides and 
insecticides. The overall objective of this study was to develop estimates of marginal 
productivity of pesticide components and investigate th~·economic efficiency of producer 
pesticide choice. 
The productivity estimates for insecticides pointed to the fact that some of the 
commonly applied chemical components did not economically reduce pest populations, 
although the marginal productivities were high. There were however, many components 
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which were economically effective with low break even prices, thereby making producer 
choice of insecticide application clear. 
Herbicide marginal productivity did not provide clear answers to producer choice 
as do insecticides. Economic efficiency is determined by elements beside increases in yield 
such as ginning costs, trash discounts, and cultivation costs. Most associated break even 
prices were greater than $10.00 and as high as $293.00 which could mean poor producer 
decision. However, some marginal productivity estimates implied economically efficient 
application and may be better choices for producers. 
In contrast to previous research in pesticide productivity, the conclusion is that no 
clear answers as to the overall productivity ofpesticides can be drawn. This stems from 
the fact that past publications have not recognized individual component productivity or 
the potential bias that could result from using aggregate d~ta. This research concludes 
that producers are choosing many chemical components that· are economically efficient, 
some that are not likely to be so, and that there is room for producers to make better 
pesticide decisions. While previous studies present an easily interpreted and potentially 
biased answer, like many economic questions the answers to pesticide productivity are 
never truly simple. 
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ABATING SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES IN AGRICULTURE 
Abstract 
Previous research has pointed towards the fact that spatial characteristics are 
important in the formation of policies aimed at abating non-point source pollution from 
agriculture. An initial theoretical examination is built which develops an understanding of 
the spatial nature of agriculture and its importance in development of policy. Several 
different policies are considered. The analysis focuses on a systern of land use permits and 
- . . 
on spatially differentiated taxes. Relative weaknesses and strengths of each policy are 
discussed. A system ofland use permits suffers from.the common criticisms of command 
'. ·--·-
and control approaches while spatially differentiated taxes maintain the appeal of a market 
oriented approach. Because the comparative efficiency of these policies becomes an 
empirical question, an analytical framework is developed to examine the importance and 
efficiency of considering spatial differences. 
A GIS system and a stochastic dynamic optimization model are used to examine 
the relative impacts for a sub-watershed in Western Oklahoma. Soils and soil acreage are 
identified using GIS and impacts of controlling nitrate leachate on these soils are examined 
using the dynamic model. Relative leachability and soil productivity determine the costs of 
controlling leachate. Under the system ofland use permits, the importance of considering 
spatial variability.was reflected in the differing cropping levels. Similarly, under spatially 
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differentiated taxes, tax levels required to achieve emissions levels were different for most 
soils. These results also highlight the importance of considering spatial differences. 
Efficiency in meeting emissions levels for the sub-watershed are also considered. 
The tax system is much more efficient in meeting a IO lb. per acre nitrate leachate 
restriction since producers are able to control inputs and outputs so that marginal costs are 
equated to· marginal value product. The difficulty with the land use permit system is 
obvious because administrators can really only control crop acreage to meet emission 
levels. The tax system is twice as efficient in terms of decreases in net returns. Wealth 
transfers under spatially differentiated taxes are less than under a land permit system. 
Net returns and total leacpate levels for the spatially differentiated tax system are 
compared with returns and leachate levels under a uniform tax. While decreases in net 
returns are less under the uniform tax, emissic;m standards are not met. Thus, uniform 
taxes that do not consider spatial differences may not e:ffectiv~. 
Keywords: 
Non-point pollution, agricultural emissions, spatial externalities, dynamic optimization. 
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ABATING SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES IN AGRICULTURE 
· Introduction 
Externalities from agricultural production exist in ~e form of non-point source 
pollution resulting from application of agricultural chemicals and fertilizers. The concern over 
control of the environmental impact of these chemicals and fertilizers is reflected in the quantity 
of research that has been dedicated to this subject (Jacobs and Casseler; Mapp et al; Teague, 
Bernardo, and Mapp; :Milon; Thomas; Johnson, Adams, and Perry; Kim, Sandreto, and 
Hostetler; Kim and Hostetler; Kim, Hostetler, and Amacher). The most common theme of 
these studies is the impact on gro1.JI1dwater quality and ecpnomic control and alleviation of 
these impacts. It could be inferred that this quantity ofresearch is a indication of both the 
complexity and importance of this issue to producer and public welfare. 
Central to these issues, especially to issues of water quality, is the means by which 
non-point source pollution can be minimized via incentives or controls ex.tended to the 
economic agents responsible for pollution. Likewise, the economic efficiency of these 
controls is at question and new and innovative approaches to controlling non-point source 
pollution are being explored (EPA). 
Griffin and Bromley have addressed efficiency and the inherent spatial nature of 
agricultural non-point pollution. They focus on agricultural run-off as an ex.temality and 
develop a theory of non-point pollution. Their conclusion is that decision makers must be 
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cognizant of both economic and environmental impacts arising from non-point pollution 
and its control. Policies may not be effective unless the impacts on the environment are 
fully realized. Additionally, there exists the possibility to conceal actual impacts, both 
economic and environmental, via economic models taht do not reflect the differing 
productive capabilities and resource constraints of different farms, productive regions, or 
productive units. 
Others such as Mapp et al. and Geleta et al. have addressed spatial concerns in 
reference to ground water quality. Geleta et al stress the importance of soil and cropping 
systems in the analysis of regional water quality. Cropping systems and major soils for the 
high plains region.are examined. for differences·in leachate and run-off resulting from 
differences in soil and cropping patterns as well as alternate management practices. 
Implicitly, this and other research reveals the importance of spatial characteristics 
and their relevance·in the analysis of non-point source pollution in agriculture. Policies 
that view agricultural pollution as a spatial problem as well as a function of input choices 
are likely to be more efficient in handling non-point source pollution (Griffin and 
Bromley). For example, in the study by Huang and LeBlanc, a residual nitrogen tax is 
developed as a means of controlling percolation due to excess application of nitrogen 
fertilizers. They note that for a residual nitrogen tax to be efficient, tax rates must vary by 
region or soil. Blanket ad valorem nitrogen taxes fail by penalizing producers who use 
land that is not vulnerable to leaching. Huang and LeBlanc, however, do not consider 
different soils in their study. 
Spatial variability and its importance have been examined outside of the 
agricultural context by Forsund. Forsund examines the impact of environmental pollution 
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due to the generation of residuals in a general equilibrium context. The dynamic problems 
associated with stocks of accumulated residuals and degradation are not considered. 
Forsund concludes that residuals must be distributed in such a way that social damage is 
equal at the margin for all loaded recipients which implies that distinction between loading 
capabilities of the environment must be made. Alternately, Tietenburg examines the 
efficiency and legality of spatially differentiated air pollution emissions charges. 
Tietenberg shows that spatially differentiated charges are much more efficient than 
uniform emissions charges. There are many ways to build spatial variability into a taxing 
system; form individual taxing jurisdictions or taxing districts to tax different emitters at 
different rates, or increase the number of geographically distinct taxing authorities where 
each authority has control over its tax rate. 
An alternate means of controlling agricultural non-point source pollution has been 
forwarded by Pan and Hodge. Pan and Hodge suggest that land use monitoring is much 
more tractable than monitoring input use. They extended a regional analysis of land use 
permits and compared their efficiency with ad valorem taxes. However, the authors fail to 
utilize spatial differentiation even though they believe that an analysis that incorporates 
unique spatial characteristics would be preferable. 
The direct assessment of policies that view externalities in agriculture as a spatial 
problem, while hinted in the literature, has not been addressed. This paper has several 
goals and reflects these deficiencies. The first part of the paper develops a theoretical 
examination of several policies which take spatial differences into account. A general 
theoretical discussion of policies aimed at controlling non-point source pollution in 
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agriculture is forwarded and policies are compared. The development centers on land use 
permits and spatially differentiated taxes. 
The second part of this manuscript compares the efficiency of these spatially sensitive 
policies for controlling agricultural non-point source groundwater pollution resulting from 
nitrate percolate for soils within a sub-watershed in Western Oklahoma. A Geographic 
Infonnation System (GIS), Arc-View, is used to determine soil acreage which is developed for 
irrigated and dryland cropping in the Cobb-Fastrunner sub'"watershed located in Caddo, 
Washita, and Custer counties. A discrete time stochastic optimal control model is developed 
for each of the distinct soils using simulation data from EPIC-5300, a biophysical simulation 
program (USDA-ARS). The optimization model accounts for the carry-over resulting from 
application of nitrogen fertilizers to produce different crops in continuous and rotation systems. 
Using this model, the relative efficiency ofland use permits and a spatially differentiated ad 
valorem nitrogen tax are tested and compared in meeting emission standards for nitrogen 
leached. This comparison is made for each soil and for the sub-watershed. 
Theory 
The argument for developing efficient emission schemes has been framed in terms 
of market oriented policies versus "command and control" policies (Tietenburg; Baumol 
and Oates; Taylor). Market oriented policies such as emission permits, input taxes, and 
output taxes, have been shown to achieve a given emission level most efficiently within the 
parameters of specific assumptions. Emission permits have the characteristic that any 
arbitrary assignment of permits will efficiently achieve a level of emissions chosen by a 
regulator if trading of these pollution permits is allowed and the market for these permits 
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is efficient (Montgomery) However, oligopolistic behavior is possible implying rent 
seeking by firms and failure to control pollution (Gibbons). 
With market solutions, such as emission permits and an input tax, agents will seek 
to equate the marginal costs of emission in terms of the licenses that must be purchased 
and the price of outputs, while uniform input taxes (Coasian taxes) seek to impose costs to 
the agent producing the externality such that full social costs of the externality are realized 
(Pearce and Turner; Tietenberg). 
These methods abstract from poliution externalities imposed in an agricultural 
context. The control of agricultural non-point source pollution is complicated by the 
difficulty associated with numerous agents, a heterogeneous set of inputs for like outputs, 
the stochastic influence of weather, andhydrologic relationships. Policies implemented to 
control emissions that account for these spatial differences in agricultural production seem 
plausible and may be more efficient. 
To provide a framework for this analysis, a mathematical structure developed by 
Montgomery is presented. The efficiency ·of achieving efficient emissions with tradeable 
effluent permits, uniform controls, land use permits, and spatial taxes is discussed. Within 
this framework, the control of agricultural pollution and the potential success of these 
methods are compared. 
Theoretical Comparison 
Following Montgomery consider a general pollution control problem faced by a 
policy maker. Define a set of integers I= {I, 2, ... , n} describing n possible units which are 
to be monitored for pollution emissions at m different monitoring locations. The term unit 
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is meant to be as general as possible to abstract from the idea of the firm, however it could 
refer to a farm level analysis or to a homogenous soil on which agricultural production 
occurs. Let the emissions vector for the n units be denoted as E = { e1 , e 2 , ••• , en} . The 
vector describing the desired level of emissions at all m locations can be described by 
Q * = { q ; , q; , ... , q: } . Let H be an m x n matrix that describes the diffusion of emissions 
by the i'th unit at measurement locationj, or H = t ~;; J. This does not exclude the 
case where His diagonal and emissions for the i'th unit impact only on the corresponding 
m'th location such as in the case of agricultural chemical percolation,into a specific soil. 
Alternately, the case where His not diagonal might be a case of agricultural run-off within 
a watershed where pollution is measured at m points in th~ watershed outlet. The above 
implies that E · H = Q and for an emissions level Q* the condition is that E · H ~ Q • . Let 
the i 'th unit face the convex cost function G i (y ii , y i2 , ••. , y ir , e i) which describes the 
minimum cost of producing outputs with emissions ~ , where (y it , y i2 , ••• , y ir ) is the set of 
outputs for the unit. Then, the profit function can be defined by, 
( 1.1) 
which is convex by virtue of the convex cost function. An important construction by 
Montgomery is 
(1.2) 
and 
( 1.3) 
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where ei is some level of effluent and ei is the level of effluent associated with the 
production set the firm would choose under no restrictions; it is assumed that ei ~ ei . 
The cost to the unit for a given emissions level is 
and the administrator's problem is: 
(1.5) min LF(e)s.t E ~ OandE·H :s;; Q·. 
The Karousch-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the saddle point of a Lagrangean 
require that: 
( 1.6) F/(eJ + Lujhii , L[ei (F((eJ + Lujhij)] = 0 
. j 
(1.7) 
8F; (e;) 
where F/(eJ = oe. . It can be shown that that there exists a solution vector 
I 
u·· ~ 0 and E** ~ 0, a vector of Lagrange multipliers and emissions respectively, which 
solve the cost minimization problem (Montgomery). 
Spatially Insensitive Solutions 
Uniform Charges 
To examine the effectiveness ofa uniform charge, for example a uniform tax, consider 
two units i and k ( or possibly two different soils for which leaching probability is different) by 
taking the ratio of the KKT conditions to show that a necessary condition would be: 
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(1.6a) F((e) ~u1hii 
F~ (ek) = LU1hki · 
I 
A unifonn tax requires that Lu I h ii = Lu I hki since the first order necessary conditions 
I I 
require that F,'( ei) = F: ( ek). Interpreted, the shadow price of diffusion for the i'th and k'th 
unit must be equated. If this problem is framed in terms of a set of agricultural producers or 
heterogeneous soils over a basin or watershed level analysis, the inherent difficulty of making 
1. 6a true becomes obvious and negates the effectiveness of a unifonn charge. 
If efficiency is addressed, begin by noting that there are no restrictions on hij or hki· 
A unifonn charge fails to levy appropriate··charges in relation to the emissions of a particular 
finn or a particular soil. Appropriate weights, i.e .. the H matrix, are not considered. Hence 
unifonn emissions charges cannot be efficient (Tieteriburg)_. _ 1'_~e for example, a case in which 
the H matrix is diagonal and represents different soils with different rates of percolation. If the 
rates of diffusion are equal~ then a unifonn tax on an input which is considered to contribute to 
non-point pollution is efficient, however the likelihood for percolation rates to be equal across 
soils is small (Folley; Fleming and Adams). 
Emissions Permits 
For efficiency, the existence of emission controls by a set of emission permits is 
accepted without rigorous treatment. As Montgomery proves, there exists an efficient cost 
minimizing emissions vector, denoted E ·, which can be achieved via a system of emission 
permits, regardless of the initial allocation of permits if the market is efficient. The solution 
implies that for the i'th unit, there exists Fi ( e:) = Fi ( e~), an efficient market permit 
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equilibrium equal to the regulator's problem which is also a competitive equilibrium. This 
treatment is a significant set of theorems and proofs which will be accepted here without 
restatement. An important point is that the existence of such an emissions vector and a 
corresponding set of licenses held by each decision unit relies heavily on the fact that for a 
given allocation, all units can achieve the license portfolio via trades with other units. A failure 
for say the i'th unit to purchase a needed license will result in disequilibria. 
The attributes of agricultural produ~ion may imply controlling agricultural 
emissions via market processes to be difficult or impossible because license trades become 
difficult. Comparisons to agricultural production ~nd typical industrial firms have been 
. . . 
made resulting in the conclusion that agricultural firms differ greatly from industrial firms. 
These differences can be des.cribed under the' guises of spatial intensity (Olson). Define 
spatial intensity here to describe the units of land required to produce an output or vector of 
outputs. In terms of the marginal production value per unit ofland, agricultural production is 
small compared to industry which produces its products on fewer units ofland. The spatial 
intensity of agriculture makes organization and communication difficult between agricultural 
producers (Olson). Spatial intensity significantly impacts the regulation of non-point emissions 
from agriculture. If the key to art efficient market is cheap and abundant information, then the 
problem is obvious. An argument against pollution permits in agriculture can be levied on 
these merits. If trades fail to take place, then an initial allocation of permits may be the 
equilibrium or close to the market equilibrium which may exacerbate the pollution problem by 
concentrating emissions. Failure of trades to be made has distributional considerations. There 
is therefore, no guarantee that the market equilibrium will efficiently achieve the level of 
emissions .desired. 
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Precisely, define A; = (a;1 , ••• ,aik))where aik is the number oflicenses oftype k 
held by the i'th unit. If H; is the i'th row of the H matrix, then let the emissions be a 
function r(H; ,A;) so that the problem is to 
(1.8) minimizeF;(eJ+ LPk(lilc -l~)s.t. e; s:;r(H;,AJ 
k 
where l ~ is the initial allocation of licenses. Montgomery defines the market equilibrium 
as the non-negative prices p• where the efficient emissions vector and license vector are 
such that the market clearing conditions below hold: 
(1.9) LPaLo~ -1~)1=0. 
k 
The above statements imply that spatial intensity of agriculture translates to 
LP:[L(l~k -1~)]:t:O. 
k 
An additional criticism to the use of emission permits in agriculture results from the 
difficulty associated with monitoring emissions. Because non-point pollution by definition is 
difficult to monitor, effluent emission standards make little sense in an agricultural context. 
Determining the number of emission permits needed and input use required under the level of 
emissions would be difficult if not impossible for a large number of producers because of 
implementation and enforecement costs (Griffin and Bromley). 
Spatially Sensitive Policies 
Land Use Permits 
Land permits, initially discussed by Pan and Hodge, could imply an efficient 
distribution of emissions by agricultural producers. As will be shown below, there exists 
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an allocation of land use permits that matches the cost minimizing competitive equilibrium 
solution achieved with emission permits in the presence of perfect information. Land use 
permits could escape ~wo essential problems noted with alternate emissions control. The 
extension ofland use permits could be easily monitored. Land use has been monitored to 
confirm producers' compliance with government programs. Secondly, land use permits do 
not require perfect information be commµnicated between producers and do not suffer 
from the problems of spatial intensity of agriculture. General trends for soils and 
agricultural practices can be easily observed and permits extended based on those 
observations (Pan -and Hodge). 
Although land use permits seem appealing in an applied format, no theoretical 
treatment of land use permits has been extended. I will use the mathematical system 
stated above to prove that there exists an eflicient-allocatfon ofland use permits which 
achieves a required level of emissions that is equal to the market equilibrium efficient 
emissions achieved with a system of tradable emissions licenses. 
Assume that Fi ( ei) is convex if and only if G i ( ei) is convex. Further, if G i ( ei) is 
strictly convex, then E .. and by implication E• are unique (Montgomery). Define a land 
use permit for the i'th production unit as Li = (mi1, mi2, ... , mir), which describes a 
possible production set of m outputs for unit i. If the regulator imposes a land use permit 
which achieves a level of emissions, ei, then agents 'in the i'th unit face the problem, 
(1.11) max 7ti = LPrmir -Gi(m;1,m;2, ... ,mir,eJ s.t. (mil,mi2"'mir)·l~L;, 
m;, 
Let m ir , L; c .n, where .n is the set of all possible output values. The parameter space of the 
output is restricted by the land use permit. The cost of the given land use permit is defined as 
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The above gives way to the following proposition: 
proposition 1. 0: there exists an emissions E achieved by the assignment of land use 
permits which is efficient. 
proof: given that there exists a solution to. the regulators problem of minimizing costs or 
min L F(e.) s.t E ~ 0 and E · H $; Q0 , which achieves the efficient vector E-. Since by 
. definition, mil c n, this=> that :l mir = Yir so that for the i'th production unit 
F(e.) = F(e0*) 0 I l 1 I • 
This leads to the following collary: 
Corollary: if there exists L; such that F;(e; ).= F;(e~·), then there exists a land use 
permit equivalent to any market license determined efficient emissions equilibrium. 
proof: this proof is trivial since from proposition 1.0 there :l Fi (eJ = Fi (e~) and 
since L Fi ( e ~·) = L Fi ( e:) , the corollary holds. 0 
By the previous statement, correct assignment of land use permits could achieve the same 
solution as that obtained under the efficient market equilibrium and by implication, land 
use permits could be an efficient cost minimizing solution to agricultural emissions. 
However, the efficiency of land use permits relies heavily on the correct 
assignment of permits. This is a potential problem if complete knowledge of the cropping 
systems and cultural practices is not known. Standard arguments that apply to command 
and control approaches to regulating emissions are applicable to land use permits (Baumol 
and Oates; Kneese and Bower). 
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Spatially Differentiated Taxes 
The argument for spatially differentiated taxes follows from the argument given against 
uniform charges. As noted, the uniform charge requires that shadow prices of diffusion be 
equated between units, which is inherently cost ineffective if the rates of diffusion are not 
similar. The imposition of a spatially differentiated tax could equate to perfect tax 
discrimination for each unit of analysis. Optimality no longer requires F{( eJ = F: ( ek). The 
differences in efficiency between spatially differentiated taxes and uniform taxes hinge on the 
rates of diffusion. In agriculture, this might be determined by the differences in soils, soil 
leachate, and run-off probabilities. If the unit of analysis is at the firm levei it may be a function 
of management practices, such as.irrigation techniq1,1es or,'in cases where manure is applied for 
fertilizer, spreading equipment {Mapp et al.; Rauschkolb and Hornsby). Following from the 
previous discussion, taxes levied based on· differing soil productivity could result in minimum 
cost control of agricultural· non-point source pollution. 
Land Use Permits and Spatial Taxes Compared 
· While both spatially differentiated taxes and land use permits have individual merit, 
efficiencies and success of each method differ. If agricultural non-point pollution results from 
inputs or overuse of inputs, both land use permits and taxes offer potential solutions. A tax 
could be constructed so that the full cost of using the input would be realized by the producer. 
Similarly, a system ofland use permits could be implemented to control production of those 
crops for which excess levels of the input are required to produce profitable yields. The 
question of which policy is most efficient hinges on the spatial variability of the area of 
84 
production as well as the possible production choices. As noted, land use pennits may suffer 
from problems typical of the command and control approach to controlling emissions. The 
relative efficiency of these policies becomes an empirical question. 
If agricultural pollution arises from production choices rather than inputs, ad valorem 
taxes which target inputs, no matter how spatially differentiated, are going to be neither 
effective nor efficient. For example, legumes that fix their own nitrogen can often be a 
significant source of nitrogen leachate even though nitrogen fertilizer is not heavily applied and 
would not be impacted under an ad valorem tax on nitrogen fertilizer (Folley). 
. Empirical Application 
Because qu~stions of efficiency are dependent on the spatial variability, it is useful to 
develop an empirical comparison of the spatial policies ofland· use pennits and spatially 
differentiated taxes. The implication that control of agricultural non-point emissions may be 
achieved efficiently by the extension of land use pennits depends largely on the ability to 
distribute permits in a spatially optimal way.· That is, such that marginal costs to producers in 
terms of foregone production are minimized while meeting leachate constraints. Similarly, for 
spatially differentiated taxes, the potential environmental damage, or the components of the H 
matrix above, must be known or estimated to develop taxes that fully reflect spatial differences 
in the separate units of production. With this knowledge, efficiency of these two policies can 
be examined and comparisons made. 
One of the most investigated and serious problems in agriculture is leachate from 
commercially applied nitrogen fertilizers into groundwater (Johnson, Adams, and Perry; 
Kim and Hostetler; Nielsen and Lee). The differences in the two policies described above 
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are investigated for their efficiency in controlling leachate from agricultural nitrogen 
application for a sub-watershed in Western Oklahoma. This area was chosen because of 
its spatial differentiability as well as the potential problems that nitrogen percolation poses 
for the area. For this study, the logical unit of spatial differentiation is chosen to be soils 
since soils play a significant role in determining the probability of leachate (Raschko lb and 
Hornsby; Mapp et al.). Using land used data provided by OSU Department of Agronomy, 
a GIS (Geographic Information System) is used to determine the soils and acreage of 
soils that are developed for dryland and irrigated cropping in the sub-watershed (Mark 
Gregory). A biophysical model which incorporates nitrogen carry"'"over is developed to 
reflect the cropping patterns and potential carry-over effects of these cropping patterns. 
Using this model, optimal land use and spatially differentiated taxes are compared for their 
efficiency for the associated soils and over.the sub-watershed. 
Area of Study 
The area chosen to study is the Cobb-Fastrunner sub-watershed in Western 
Oklahoma. Most of this sub-watershed lies in the hydrologic sub-region Red-Washita river 
basin with a small percentage in the Lower Canadian River Basin and with approximate 
center degree coordinates of98'30° longitude and 35'15° latitude. This sub-watershed 
comprises an area of over 240,000 acres. Land use is primarily agricultural with 168,907 
acres in dryland cropping or improved range coverage. A total area of 31,683 acres is 
developed for irrigated production. The sub-watershed overlies areas of Caddo, Washita, 
and Custer counties. On a percentage basis, 71% overlies Caddo county, 26% in Washita 
county, and 2% in Custer county (Land Use Data, Mark Gregory). 
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The source of irrigation water is the Rush Springs Aquifer. The Rush Springs 
Aquifer is an alluvial aquifer described as a poorly cemented, reddish brown, fine-grained 
sandstone that locally is silty or argillaceous, and contains several thin but persistent beds 
of gypsum or anhydrite and dolomite, which produces high quality water that is generally 
potable. Well yields range from 20 to 600 gallons per minute but some producing wells 
exceed 1200 gallons per minute. Saturated thickness ranges from Oto 394 ft in the study 
area. Data from 1990 statistics show that upwards of 5 5 million gallons per day were 
withdrawn from the Rush Springs Aquifer (Becker). Of that total, 78% (42.8 mil gal/d) 
was devoted to irrigated agriculture. (Becker) 
GIS data reveal there are extensive differentiation in the soils in the production area 
with 53 different soils ranging from clay loams to fine sandy loams identified. A large number 
of these soils are susceptible to high rates of percolation (Soil Surveys, Caddo, Washita, and 
Custer Counties). A 1994 study by the USGS identified 91 test wells that exceeded the 
maximum contaminant level for nitrogen in the study area. This is approximately 30% of all 
the wells tested throughout the Rush Springs Aquifer. Many of these are in the north central 
portion of Caddo, eastern regions ofWashita, and south-eastern portions of Custer county and 
within the boundaries of the Cobb-Fastrunner sub-watershed. 
Agricultural Production and Cultural Practices 
Agricultural crop production in Caddo, Washita, and Custer counties is mainly 
wheat, peanuts, grain sorghum, and cotton. Caddo county ranks first in peanut 
production for the state with 31,500 acres of peanuts planted in 1995 with an average 
yield of 2490 lbs. per acre. Planted acreages of cotton, wheat, and sorghum for 1995 are 
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14,600, 230,000, and 8,600 with average yields of 163 lbs. oflint, 25.6 bu. per acre, and 
58 bu. per acre respectively (Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics 1995). 
Washita county produces mostly wheat with 250,000 planted acres in 1995 and an 
average yield of 24. 3 bu per acre. Planted cotton acreage for 1995 was greater than 
40,000 acres and had an average yield of 175 pounds oflint per acre. Washita had only 
700 acres of planted peanuts in 1995 and 3500 acres of grain sorghum (Oklahoma 
Agricultural Statistics 1995). However, peanut production was in the eastern part of the 
county and likely to be in.the area of the Cobb-Fastrunner sub-watershed where the soils 
are favorable for peanut production (Ron Sholar). 
Producers in Custer county planted 260,000 acres of wheat in 1995 with an 
average yield of 23.1 bu. per acre and no peanuts were planted. Total planted acreage of 
cotton was 6400 with an average yield of 134 lbs. oflint per acre. Producers planted 
5000 acres of grain sorghum in 1995.with an average yield of 46:6 bushels per acre 
(Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics 1995). 
For soils in which peanut production is feasible, including sands, loams, and fine 
sandy loams, common production practices are to rotate with either cotton, sorghum, or 
wheat to minimize pesticide requirements. However this practice depends on rainfall, 
pests, and prices of alternate crops (Ramming~ Sholar ). Peanuts are intensively farmed 
with 90% of producers applying on average 35 lbs. of nitrogen per acre (Brooks and Ali). 
Irrigated peanuts are watered heavily to insure proper growth even though average rainfall 
exceeds 3 5 inches per year (Ramming). 
Sorghum, cotton, and wheat are less intensively farmed. Fertilizer is commonly 
applied to all crops and levels vary with soil nutrient requirements. Nitrogen is applied to 
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96% of all winter wheat at an average of 72 pounds of actual nitrogen per acre (Oklahoma 
Agricultural Statistics, 1995). 
Biophysical Model 
Numerous studies which incorporate biophysical relationships and outcomes have 
been developed to examine impacts from non-point source pollution on groundwater and 
the environment. Examples of static models ( single period stochastic and non-stochastic 
optimization models) can be found in Teague, Bernardo and Mapp and Pan and Hodge. 
In these static models, relationship coefficients are often estimated and used as fixed 
coefficients in programming models. The models are used to find optimal outcomes 
subject to a restricted parameter space as defined by the estimated biological relationships. 
Leaching or runoff relationships are the most often studied problem (Connor, Perry and 
Adams; Sun, Houston, and Bergstrom; Thomas and Boisvert). 
While static models are often used because of their mathematical tractability, the 
inherent dynamics of biological systems mean that dynamic analysis should offer more 
robust results. Development of models which incorporate all biological relationships 
would be impossible (Bouzaher et al} However, biological models can be used to 
examine general trade-offs and risks associated with physical actions. While the results 
will not predict actual outcomes, they will describe impacts, directions of impacts, and 
rank outcomes (Johnson, Adams, and Perry). 
Studies conducted using dynamic biological relationships can be found in Kim and 
Hostetler; Kim, Sandretto, and Hostettler; Segarra et al; Johnson, Adams and Perry; and 
Conrad. Previous research dictates that for efficient analysis, dynamic relationships should 
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be incorporated into the model. A dynamic model of nitrogen leachate can be developed 
which incorporates biophysical processes of nitrogen from site specific agricultural 
production practices. Solutions to this model will imply optimal spatial cropping subject 
to meeting leachate restrictions and resource constraints. 
Optimal use of nitrogen fertilizers has been studied by Segarra et al; Taylor; 
Thomas and Boisvert; and Kennedy. Crop management and crop rotations are often used 
to supplement nutrients for those crops which require additional nutrients, especially 
nitrogen to obtain profitable yields (Folley). Total nitrogen available to the plant is a 
function of nitrogen applied, nitrogen that has been carried over from previous nutrient 
application, and nitrogen that has- been produced naturally ( either fixed , mineralized, or 
exogenous sources such as rainfall) as well as precipitation, irrigation water applied, crop 
rooting depth, and unique soil characteristics. Such characteristics as soil unif<:>rmity and 
depth may determine. nitrogen availability· and utilization.· These factors in tum are 
important to the potential of nitrogen leachate as it is a function of soil properties, crop 
management, and nitrogen inputs (Rauschk:olb and Hornsby). All of these factors have the 
potential to positively and negatively impact yields and thus profits. Therefore, these 
relationships must be incorporated into the dynamic model. 
The dynamic optimization model below derives optimal levels of nitrogen, 
irrigation water, and land produced under each crop over the decision period for each set 
of unique soil parameters in the study area. This model follows that developed by Segarra 
et al., which used available nitrogen as a transition variable, and Thomas and Boisvert 
which included multiple crop rotations. To account for the stochastic nature of 
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precipitation, rainfall is included using a gaussian-quadrature approach (Preckel and 
DeVuyst). 
Gaussian-q1iadrature approximates expectations using probability mass and points. 
The points and weights are chosen so that the moments for the discrete approximation to 
the distribution match to moments of the true distribution for the O'th through some fixed 
order (Preckle and DeVuyst). Here, precipitation is assumed to follow a binomial 
distribution because the binomial has a flexible form and has been used in previous work 
(Dai, Fletcher, and Lee; Thomas and Boisvert) 
The dynamic optimization model for the q'th soil is 
(2.0) 
T r . . l 
. max N R q = L p tl i ~ p rJri1 . y it ( n a it' wit's j) - p nit . nit - pw it . wit ]j. A. it 
(A .. ,n;,.w;,l t=l I J 
subject to: 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
nait = L prj ·{f(n;i,nmit>wit>sj,nrit>nfi1 )) 
j 
1;1 = Lprj ·( f(w;"nai"sJ) 
j 
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(2.9) LA.it ::;; 1 
(2.10) n r11 A It ·(na1c1-1))+ A It . (n a 6(1-1)) = 
A 1c1-1> + A 6(1-1> A I (t - I ) + A 6 (t- I ) 
(2. 11) A 21 
· ( n a 2ct-1 >) + A 11 . (n a 7Ct-l>) n f 21 = 
A 2ct-1> + A 1ct-1> A 2c1-1i + 11. 1c1-1i 
(2.12) ~t . (na2c1-l)) + ~t . (na,ct-ll) n r3t = 
A.ict-1 > + A1<t-1 > A.ict-1> + A,c1-1> 
(2.13) A 4t ·(na4<t-1i). n r 4t = 
A.4(t-l) 
· A 6t 
·(nasct-1>) n r6t = 
Asct-1> 
(2.14) 
A 11 
. (nasct-1)) n r71 = 
Asct-1> 
(2.15) 
(2.16) . ·., n rst A St · (nasct-1>) · 
Asct-1> 
(2.17) 11. it , n it , w it , n m it , n a it ,. n r it :2: 0 
(2.18) A;o,n;0 w;0 ,na;0 ,nm;0 ,and nf0 given, 
where NRq is the .per a~re present value of expected returns to land, irrigation water, 
. . 
nitrogen applied, and cropping choice for the q'th soil. For the readers convenience, a 
complete list of notation for equations 2.0 - 2.18 is given in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Notation Summary for Bioeconomic Model. 
Subscripts: 
Crops 
Year 
Soils 
Variables: 
Parameters: 
prj 
fit 
lit 
nmit 
ni;1 
Standards: 
i=l,2, .... ,8 
1 =irrigated cotton following irrigated cotton 
2=dryland cotton following dryland cotton 
3=sorghum following dryland cotton 
4=wheat following wheat 
S=peanuts 
6=irrigated cotton following peanuts 
7=dryland cotton following peanuts 
8=sorghum following peanuts 
t=l,2, .... ,T 
q=l,2, ... ,Q 
.,,, 
nitrogen available to the i'th crop in year t. 
acre inches of irrigation water applied to the i'th crop year t. 
percentage of acre devoted to the i'th crop in year t. 
nitrogen applied to the i'th crop in year t. 
probability mass associated with the j'th gaussian-quadrature point for 
random precipitation. 
probability mass associated with the f th gaussian-quadrature point for 
random precipitation. . . . 
yield response to water, nitrogen available, and-precipitation for the i'th crop 
year t. 
unit return net ofnitrogen fertilizer and irrigation water in year t for the i'th crop. 
expected leachate from the i'th crop in year t. 
expected nitrogen mineralized by the i'th crop in year t. 
nitrogen fixed by the i'th crop in year t. 
Lb total expected leachate restriction for one acre of production. 
Equation 2.0 is the objective function to be maximized in nitrogen fertilizer, irrigation 
water, and percentage ofland devoted to crop ~ or nit, Wit, and A.it respectively. The 
parameters p', fit, P11i1, and pwi1 are the discount parameter, return to crop i in the t'th year net 
of nitrogen applied and water applied, price of nitrogen applied in year t, and price of water 
applied in year t respectively. The parameter Yit is the yield response 
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function for the i'th crop as a function of nitrogen available in the root zone, irrigation water 
applied, and stochastic precipitation s.; with associated gaussian-quadrature probability prj. 
Equation 2.1 is the carry-over equation for expected available nitrogen for the i'th crop in year 
t as a function of nitrogen fertilizer applied, nitrogen mineralized, irrigation water applied, 
stochastic precipitation, residual nitrogen available for period t, and nitrogen fixed in t. 
Equation 2.2 is the expected level of nitrogen mineralized for crop i in period t as a function of 
nitrogen applied, irrigation water applied, and precipitation. Equation 2.3 is expected leachate 
as a function of irrigation water, nitrogen available in the root-zone, and precipitation. Total 
expected leachate for an acre is limited by equation 2.4 where Li, is the upper bound on 
leachate. Equations 2.5 - 2.8 are rotation restrictions for irrigated cotton, dryland cotton, 
sorghum following dryland cotton, and irrigated cotton, dryland cotton, and sorghum following 
peanuts. As will be discussed below, this model assumes that peanuts are always grown in 
. . . ~ ' 
rotation to minimize chemical requirements and maximize soil fertility (Elder; Ramming). 
Equations 2.9 - 2.15 are the transition equations for residual nitrogen in the root-zone available 
to each respective crop and equations 2.16 and 2.17 are positivity constraints and initial 
conditions respectively. 
Data, Methods, and Procedures 
Simulation Data 
The relationships that exist among biological systems are rarely observable. Thus, 
researchers often use biophysical simulation models to represent biological systems (Mapp 
et al). Further, statistically fitting equations to these estimated relationship offers a way of 
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summarizing and managing these data (Bouzaher et al). EPIC-5300 (Environmental 
Policy Integrated Climate) was used to estimate the parameters for the bio-physical model 
above. Nitrogen levels and irrigation levels were parameterized to develop 1000 years of 
simulation data to create the yield response, nitrogen mineralization response, nitrogen 
leachate response, and total nitrogen available response functions for each of the cropping 
systems listed in Table 1. This was done for each of the cropped soils identified for the 
study area using weather pa,rameters from the weather station .located in Weatherford, 
Oklahoma. 
Previous research gives no clear indication of functional specification for the biological 
relationships. Yield response to nitrogen availability has been estimated using the :Mitscherlich-
Spillman functional form (Rauschkolb and Hornsby). More typical is a quadratic approach 
which captures negative.marginal returns-to .available·nutrients.(Segarraetal). Alternate 
functional forms were tried, but a quadratic functional form was chosen because it provided the 
best overall statistical fit for the soils in the study area. Additionally, the range of functional 
forms was limited both by the number of soils used in this study as well as the stipulation that 
non-convexities in the response functions must be limited. Because of the number of soils 
developed in this study, separate functional forms for each soil, while ideal, were not feasible. 
The functional form chosen for the yield response is: 
(3.1) 
where the parameter notation is the same as given in Table 1. General statistical fit was 
good with measures oflinear correlation (corrected R2) ranging from .30 to .70 depending 
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on the cropping system and soil estimated. The signs of the coefficients were as expected 
with the squared terms negative and linear terms positive. Cross product terms varied in 
sign depending on the crop. Statistical significance of the coefficients also varied, but they 
were often significant at the 90% confidence level. 
Nitrogen mineralization response was specified as a linear function of nitrogen fertilizer 
applied, irrigation water applied, and random precipitation. The functional form is: 
(3.2) 
This functional form reflects Broadbent's research on nitrogen mineralization 
(Management of Nitrogen in Irrigated Agriculture pg. 120-125). Levels of nitrogen 
mineralization are correlated with nitrogen fertilizer as well as available water. Statistical 
fit was good with R2 averaging .8 to .9 and coefficient statistical significance at the 90 
percent confidence level. 
For available nitrogen, a linear specification is used to account for the available 
nitrogen sources as well as nitrogen carry-over from previous crops. The function is 
specified as: 
(3.3) nait = f3o + f31n.1 + f32nmi1 + J33wit + J34st +f3snrit + J36nfit + et. 
Coefficient signs were as expected, with available nitrogen decreasing in water applied and 
increasing in nitrogen fixed, nitrogen applied, and nitrogen mineralized. Linear correlation 
varied by crop and by soil. 
Finally, leachate was modeled as a linear function in irrigation water, precipitation, 
and total nitrogen available to the plant. Total nitrogen is assumed to be nitrogen 
mineralized, average nitrogen fixed, and nitrogen fertilizer applied. The function form is: 
(3.4) 
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The functional fit was deemed superior to others both statistically as well as in its 
simplicity. Measures of linear correlation corrected for the intercept restriction were all 
greater than .8 and coefficients for all soils and cropping rotations were highly significant. 
Return and Cropping Assumptions 
The cropping rotations assumed for this study are outlined in Table 1. Cost, 
chemical, price, and yield assumptions used in deriving net returns for each of the crops 
. ' 
· are given in Table 2. Oklahoma enterprise budgets were used to determine fixed costs and 
discussion with chemical specialists helped determine common chemicals used (Jim 
Criswell, personal correspondenqe). The chemical regimes assume intensive cropping. 
Table 2. Cost~ Chemical, Price, Yield, and Net·Return Assumptions for Cotton, Wheat, 
Sorghum and Peanuts. 
Crop Fixed a Chemical• Chemicals Applied·· Average• Priceb Netc 
Costs Costs Yield Return 
Dryland 75.57 5.33 Bidrin, Ethyl-Parathion, 392 .66 .4536 
Cotton Cypermethin 
Irrigated 141.37 17.66 Treflan, Bidrin, Ethl- 501 .66 .3463 
Cotton· Parathion, 
Cypermethin, 
Dimethoate 
Wheat 64.23 14.75 2,4-D, Glean, 33.2 3.78 1.88d 
Dimethoate, Methyl-
Parathion, Lorsban 
Sorghum 46.62 1.10 Ethyl-Parathion, 38.1 2.58 1.15 
Atrazine 
Irrigated 215.26 142.36 Vemam, Balan, Dual, 3134 .2875 .17 
Peanuts Bugle, Bravo, 
Orthene, Nemacur 
• On a per acre basis in 1996 prices. 
b Ten year averages for Caddo county. 
c Units are per pound of lint for cotton, per bushel for wheat and sorghum, and per pound 
for peanuts. 
d Includes a $16.00 per acre imputed value for winter wheat pasture. 
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Ten year average yields were derived from USDA county level data. Because the 
largest area of study overlies Caddo County, average yields from Caddo were used. Price 
assumptions are 1996 estimates taken from Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute publications while cost data is on a 1995 basis. Return assumptions for the crops 
were found by dividing net returns by the average yield to get a unit return net of fertilizer 
costs and irrigation water costs. To account for the value of winter wheat pasture, an 
imputed value of $16.00 per acre was included in the wheat return assumptions (Doye and 
Kletke ). The nitrogen fertilizer price assumption was 13 cents per pound of actual 
nitrogen and irrigation water was assumed to cost $3 .20 per acre inch. 
Cropping rotations were developed from discussion with area conservation 
specialists, soil scientists, and from agricultural statistics (Brad Elder and Phil Perryman, 
personal correspondence). Cropping distribution among soils is essential to this analysis. 
Additional discussion with area specialists helped determine soils on which peanut 
production is common and most productive. Peanuts are seldom dryland cropped and are 
the major irrigated crop in north Caddo county. A list of major cropped soils used in this 
study is given in Table 3. The irrigated soils are Cobb fine sandy loam, Dougherty and 
Eufala complex, Shellabarger, Grant loam, Pond Creek fine sandy loam, Port silt loam, 
and Mclain. Peanuts are feasible and grown on all of these irrigated soils except for 
Mclain. It is assumed that all irrigated acres are irrigated with center pivot sprinkler 
systems. For the dryland soils, major crops are small grains and cotton. As noted, small 
grains, specifically winter wheat, are the most common dryland crop. Rainfall patterns 
and common cultural practices dictate that although cotton can be a profitable crop, 
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producers do not plant it as often. It is assumed that no more than 30 percent of any one 
soil is cropped in dryland cotton. Small grains and cotton are commonly grown on all the 
soils in this study ex:ept for the Woodward, Lucien, and Hardeman series. It is assumed 
that only winter wheat is cropped on these soils (Soil Surveys, Caddo, Custer, and 
Washita Counties). 
Table 3. Land Acreage and Percent of Sub-Watershed. 
Soil Series 
Pulaski 
Cobb fine sandy loam 
Cobb fine sandy loam a 
Reinach silt loam 
Shellabarger 
Shellabarger a 
Dougherty loamy fine sand 
Dougherty & Eufala 
Dougherty & Eufala complex a 
Eufala fine sand 
Gracemont 
Hardeman 
Grant loam 
Grant loam a 
Woodward silt loam 
Konowa loamy fine sand 
Lucien Dill fine sandy loam 
Noble fine sandy loam 
Noble fine sandy loam a 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam a 
Minco very fine sand 
Port silt loam 
Port silt loam a 
McLain a 
a Denotes irrigated soils. 
Acres 
1275.28 
7097.94 
355.88 
771.08 
168.05 
889.71 
4834.10 
2076.001 
1482.85 . 
1690.45 
355.88 
2471.43 
6900.23 
4122.34 
148.28 
1008.34 
731.54 
1235.71 
573.37 
132537.90 
23933.33 
128.51 
2847.08 
1166.51 
444.85 
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Percent of Area 
.64 
3.56 
.17 
.38 
.08 
.44 
2.42 
1.04 
.74 
.84 
.17 
1.24 
3.46 
2.06 
.74 
.50 
.36 
.62 
.28 
66.51 
12.01 
.06 
1.42 
.58 
.22 
Soils Data 
Since a goal of this analysis is to develop the relationship between spatial 
variability and agricultural emissions, every effort was extended to develop accurate soils 
data for input into the EPIC biophysical simulation model. All soils which were cropped 
in areas greater than I 00 acres were identified using Arc-View and digital land use data 
provide by OSU Department of Agronomy (Mark Gregory). The soils and acreage of 
. each soil are listed in Table 3. The most prevalent soil in the sub-watershed is the Pond 
Creek series, however the Cobb and Dougherty series are also extensive. Soils parameter 
input data was collected from the Soils Y soils database for Oklahoma developed by the 
USDA. For comparison, data from the MUUF v2.14 program available from the 
Grasslands Research Center was also collected. Initial investigations revealed that MUUF 
'·';,:-.. ~·2 ; .. 
data was not as accurate since soil parameters were not necessarily based on soil samples 
from Caddo, Custer, or Washita counties while the Soils V soils database is based on 
county specific soil samples. Moreover, EPIC output, especially nitrogen leachate 
estimates, are sensitive to a number of these soil parameters, especially pH (EPIC Model 
Documentation) .. Also, yield estimates using the Soils V data were deemed to be closer to 
county averages. Soils used and their primary surface textures are given in Table 4. 
Most of the soils cropped contain significant amounts of sand which increases 
permeability. The permeability classification for the soils identified ranges from slowly 
permeable to moderately rapid with most classified as moderately permeable. Note that 
most of the soils have shallow surface horizons which are generally less than twelve inches 
deep with Reinach and Port series the exception. 
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Table 4. Initial Soil Horizon Textures by Soil Series for Major Cropped Soils in the Cobb-Fastrunner Sub-watershed. 
Soil Series Horizon" % Siltb % Sandb Bulk Density pH Saturated Permeability 
Conductivity Classification 
Pulaski 0- 10 36 58 1.525 6.45 4 moderately rapid 
Cobb fine sandy loam 0-8 30 64 1.45 6.95 4 moderately permeable 
Reinach silt loam 0-32 65 31 1 .425 7.25 1.3 moderately permeable 
Shellabarger 0-9 34 51 1.45 6.45 1.3 moderately permeable 
Dougherty loamy fine sand 0-7 15 75 l.55 5.8 4 moderately permeable 
Dougherty & Eufala 0-7 15 75 1.55 5.8 4 moderately permeable 
Dougherty & Eufala complex 0-7 15 75 J.55 5.8 4 moderately permeable 
Eufala fine sand 0-8 5 77 1.575 6.2 4 rapidly permeable 
Hardeman 0- 10 30 40 1.45 7.9 4 moderately rapid 
Hollister silt loam 0- 11 75 15 1.45 7.5 .4 slowly permeable 
0 Grant loam 0-9 65 31 1.4 6.95 1.3 moderately permeable .... 
Woodward silt loam 0- 10 65 31 1.45 7.5 1.3 moderately permeable 
Konowa loamy fine sand 0-7 15 75 1.55 5.8 4 moderately permeable 
Lucien Dill fine sandy loam 0~7 36 44 1.425 6.45 4 moderately rapid 
Noble fine sandy loam 0-9 36 58 1.45 6.45 4 moderately permeable , 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 0 - 13 36 58 1.45 6.2 4 moderately permeable 
Minco very fine sand 0 - 12 65 31 1.475 6.45 1.3 moderately permeable 
Port silt loam 0- 22 65 31 1.425 6.7 1.3 moderately permeable 
McLain 0- 14 80 16 1.45 7 .4 moderately slow 
a Corresponds to the surface horizon in inches. 
b Percentage by weight. 
c Same soil characteristics as Dougherty and Eufala. 
The soils series of Dougherty loamy fine s~nd, Dougherty and Eufala, and 
Dougherty and Eufala complex are assumed to have the same soil characteristics. Soils V 
data on each of these soil series were compared and all were similar except for surface 
horizon depth which differed very little. 
Solution Procedure 
The optimal allocation of land use permits depends on finding mir c O for a given 
ei overt periods. Since the regulator is concerned with Q different soils, the problem can 
be solved by finding L, = (mi., mj2 ,.,.,mir) for all soils which maximize producer profit 
and minimizes the producers cost of meeting the emission level. Solving the biophysical 
model defined in equations 2.0 ~ 2.18 with no leachate restriction gives a steady state 
solution for the resulting optimal levels of nitrogen, irrigation water applied, cropping 
percentages, and the resulting emissions. To find optimal cropping percentages and the 
implied land use permit, nitrogen and irrigation water application are·fixed at the optimal 
levels and solved with a leachate restriction imposed. The final output is the land use 
levels.required to achieve the level ofleachate set by the regulator. The underlying 
assumption is that producers always apply the optimal levels of inputs for each crop. Note 
however, this method abstracts from the proof given in the theoretical section because the 
minimum cost may not be reached with changing output mix but also with input mix 
contrary to what is assumed above. This method reflects the way in which land use 
permits would have to be imposed because an administrator, unless omnipotent, would be 
unable to efficiently monitor input levels. Because leachate levels and optimal input levels 
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will differ by soil, spatial variability is recognized by solving the model for each soil and 
distinct set of soil parameters. 
To find the cptimal tax level, the biophysical model was solved over parameterized 
values of nitrogen prices scaled to reflect the imposition of a tax. Like solutions used to 
find land use permits, steady state levels are taken to be optimal input choices under each 
tax level. As with the land use permits, spatial variability is recognized via solutions over 
the different soils and the corresponding productivity of the inputs. 
For insight into the productivity of each soil and the costs associated with 
emissions abatements, the biophysical model is solved over the leachate bounds of 20 and 
1 O pounds of nitrogen leachate per acre. When compared to the unrestricted solution, 
costs of abatement and net return sensitivity to emissi9ns restrictions can be developed. 
This is an indirect 111easure of the parameters in the diffusion matrix H. 
The biophysical model was coded and solved with GAMS, a FORTRAN based 
interface for the non-linear optimization routine MINOS (Brooke). The difficulty 
associated with non-linear intertemporal models is the possibility of convergence to a 
stationary point that is not a global optimum (Bryson and Ho). With this in mind, great 
care was taken to develop accurate starting values. Preliminary experiments showed that 
steady states were found before five iterations if average simulation values of nitrogen, 
irrigation water, and available nitrogen, which were different for each soil, were used as 
starting values. Sensitivity analysis showed that steady state values were usually 
unaffected by the starting values other than the length of time required to achieve a steady 
state. Scaling did not seem to be a problem. To minimize computational costs, a ten year 
time period was chosen for this study. 
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Comparing Policies that Reduce Nitrogen Leachate 
Baseline 
The model·was solved initially with no leachate restrictions to establish a baseline 
for comparison. The cropping percentages, expected leachate, and expected returns are 
presented in Table 5. All soil series for which cotton and winter wheat are commonly 
cropped, except for the Minco series, solve to the upper bounds of 30% in dryland 
cotton and 70% in winter wheat. This reflects the upper bound imposed on dryland 
cotton acreage. While seemingly arbitrary, this reflects both cultural concerns as well as 
common agricultural practices. Minco very fine sand is the only son.series on which grain 
sorghum after dryland cotton is grown. The . 73 cent per bushel price difference between 
grain sorghum and winter wheat makes grain sorghum less feasible except at higher grain 
sorghum yields or lower winter wheat yields or some combination. Ten year discounted 
expected returns range from a low of $296.96 per acre on the Konowa series to a high of 
$595.67 on the Pulaski series. The low returns on the Konowa series reflect the low 
native fertility as well as the fact that it is a highly eroded soil (Soil Survey, Caddo 
. . 
County). The range of returns represents the differences in the productivity of the soil 
series in this study. Expected yields and nitrogen input levels for Baseline solutions are 
given in Table 6. Nitrogen input levels for dryland cotton are 15 to 20 lbs. of actual 
nitrogen. Again, the Konowa series has the lowest yield for dryland cotton. On some 
series such as on Reinach, the biophysical model solves to low nitrogen input levels and it 
could be inferred that additional nutrient application for dryland is not profitable. 
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For dry land wheat cropping, steady state yields range from 17 bushels per acre to 3 5 
bushels per acre. On soils on which wheat profitably responds to nitrogen fertilizer, the 
optimal level of nitrogen fertilizer applied is 35 to 86 lbs of actual nitrogen. For grain 
sorghum which is cropped only on the Minco series, 33 lbs of nitrogen fertilizer is required 
for a yield of 3 5 bushels per acre. This lower level of nitrogen applied to grain sorghum 
when compared to average nitrogen applied to wheat reflects the fertilizer credits derived 
from the cotton-grain sorghum rotation. 
Steady state levels of expected nitrogen leachate for each of the soil series are 
given in Table 5. Leachate levels, when compared with levels of nitrogen applied, agree 
with expectations. Soils which are highly permeable have higher rates of diffusion than 
less permeable soils. True validation oflevels ofleachate is difficult, however nitrogen 
budgets reveal that 60 to 80% of actual nitrogen applied to winter wheat is used by the 
plant with the remaining percentage either leached or removed by natural processes. 
Levels of leachate vary with weather and soil characteristics (Management of Nitrogen in 
Irrigated Agriculture; Rauschkolb and Hornsby). For example, on the Lucien series, 
44.38 lbs of nitrogen is applied and 15.1 lbs or 34% is leached below the root-zone. The 
highest leachate is on the Reinach series followed by the Minco series. 
Irrigated acres solve to the upper bounds imposed on peanut and cotton rotations. 
Irrigated acres are cropped in either irrigated cotton or peanuts for all soils except the 
Dougherty and Eufala complex series which is cropped in irrigated peanuts and dryland cotton. 
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Table 5. Cropping Percentages, Expected Leachate, and Expected Returns for Base Solutions. 
Soil Series I/I" D/Db DISC W/Wd PIP e P/1 r P/Dg Expected Leachateh Net Returns; 
lbs I acre $ I acre 
Pulaski .3 .7 19.5 595.67 
Cobb Fine sandy loam .3 .7 20.1 533.75 
Cobb Fine sandy loam i .5 .5 6.69 1577.72 
Reinach Silt Loam .3 .7 25.4 494.79 
Shellabarger .3 .7 17.0 421.94 
Shellabargeri .5 .5 8.65 1359.42 
Dougherty loamy fine sand .3 .7 14.65 438.28 
Dougherty & Eufala .3 .7 14.65 438.28 
Dougherty & Eufala complexi .5 .5 7.9 1644.88 
Eufala fine sand .3 .7 21.20 408.10 
Hardeman l 12.2 314.88 
Grant loam .3 .5 17.9 638.32 
0 Grant Ioami .5 .5 6.5 2262.65 
0\ Woodward silt loam 1 17.10 235.94 
Konowa loamy fine sand .3 .7 15.70 296.96 
Lucien Dill fine sandy loam 1 15.1 223.75 
Noble Fine sandy loam. .3 .7 16.3 395.30 
Noble Fine sandy loam J .5 .5 9.50 1585.29 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam .3 .7 18.20 555.34 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam i .5 .5 15.71 2011.04 
Minco very fine sand .3 .3 .4 25.10 431.13 
Port Silt loam .3 .7 15.3 566.71 
Port Silt loam i .5 .5 5.3 1877.46 
McLain .3 .3 .4 6.6 924.00 
a Continuous irrigated cotton; b Continuous dryland cotton; c Sorghum after dryland cotton; d Continuous wheat; 
e Peanuts; c Irrigated cotton after peanuts; 8 Dryland cotton after Peanuts. 
h Steady state levels for one acre . 
'. Expected ten year discounted net returns. 
1 Denotes Irrigated Soils. 
Table 6. Expected Yields and Levels of Nitrogen Applied by Crop and by Soil for Base Solutions·. 
Soil Series C1 8 C2 8 C3 8 C4 8 Cs 8 c6• C7 8 D1 8 02 8 03 8 "4 a 05 8 "68 n1" 
Pulaski 321 27 20.76 67.17 
Cobb fine sandy loam 258 31 23.36 69.32 
Cobb fine sandy loam b 2439 613 28.00 11.74 
Reinach silt loam 213 32 2.32 56.12 
Shellabarger 203 25 8.14 65.08 
Shellabarger b 2406 517 0 8.43 
Dougherty loamy fine sand 247 22 20.47 65.71 
Dougherty & Eufala complex b 2606 258 24.IO 3.82 
Dougherty and Eufala 247 22 20.47 65.71 
Eufala fine sand 202 24 10.33 59.54 
Hardeman 29 35.16 
Grant loam 353 32 17.49 64.00 
0 Grant loamb 2693 926 21.00 45.02 
-.J 
Woodward silt loam 19 57.16 
Konowa loamy fine sand 153 17 7.48 55.59 
Lucien Dill fine sandy loam 22 44.38 
Noble fine sandy loam 209 21 15.65 61.40 
Noble fine sandy loam b 2267 767 22.23 2.83 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 262 32 4.79 57.99 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam b 2724 757 26.25 63.28 
Minco very fine sand 244 35 23 21.91 33.16 86.48 
Port silt Loam 262 35 0 62.86 
Port silt Loam b 2585 558 17 0 
McLainb 567 163 25 58.94 0 0 
--
• Variables as defined in Table 1. 
• Steady state levels for one acre . 
b Denotes Irrigated Soils. 
This cropping pattern reflects the amount of water required to maintain profitable 
cotton yields on this soil series. The average amount of nitrogen applied to peanuts is less 
than 30 lbs of nitrogen and agrees with the common practice of applying starter nitrogen 
(Sholar; Brooks). 
Net returns are naturally higher for irrigated acreage. This reflects the relative 
profitability of peanuts and irrigated cotton. Grant loam soils have the highest discounted 
net returns due in part to the high yields on cotton. Pond creek soils follow with ten year 
discounted net returns of $2011.04. 
On most of the irrigated soils, nitrogen is applied to irrigated cotton with the largest 
amount of nitrogen applied on the Pond Creek series. Leachate is greater on Pond Creek 
irrigated soils than on any other irrigated soil. Average levels of inigation water applied to 
peanuts were 20 to 30 acre inches per acre ofwater,while inigated cotton received an average 
of 18 to 22 acre inches per acre of water. Leachate is less for most of the inigated soils than 
for dryland soils. This is due to the differences in both cropping practices and the timing of 
rainfall. Since a large percentage of dryland acres are devoted to winter wheat and high levels 
of nitrogen are applied, higher levels of leachate result from increased rainfall in the period of 
September to June (National Climactic Data Center). Note that under the baseline solutions no 
grain sorghum is cropped for any of the soil series. 
Peanut and cotton yields are within acceptable ranges although peanuts yields are 
on average lower than expected with the high input levels. Since differences between the 
soil series are preserved, no adjustments were made to the yields. This discrepancy should 
not affect the analysis. Cotton yields are considered representative. 
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Soil Characteristics and· Cost of Abatement 
As has been discussed, unique spatial characteristics will determine the cost of 
controlling emissions. In this study, soil characteristics for each series will determine 
those soils which require higher levels of nutrients and/or those soils which have the 
highest probability of leaching. The minimum cost of meeting emission standards would 
arise where input levels as well as cropping amounts could be controlled to arrive at the 
chosen emission standard. The difference between net returns: from the baseline solutions 
and this minimum cost solution would give an indication of abatement costs as well as 
insight into relative soil productivity. 
The difference in net returns between base solutions and solutions for a system of 
land use permits would be larger since inputs are fixed and the optimal levels ofland 
percentages change. This difference.does not give as much insight into the relative 
productivity of each soil and highlights a relative weakness of land use permits. If a policy 
fails to fully consider the differences .in each soil,. then the policy cannot be as cost efficient 
in achieving ·an emission standard as policies which can fully recognize differences in soils. 
Using baseline solutions from the biophysical model and solutions with a maximum 
leachate levels imposed, cost of abatement for each series has been derived. Table 7 
outlines the abatement costs for each soil for leachate levels of 20 and 10 lbs per acre 
respectively. Abatement costs are estimated as the difference in net returns between the 
baseline solutions and solutions with an emission standard imposed. Note that solutions 
with emission standards imposed are achieved by changing both input and output levels. 
Since leachate for most soils does not greatly exceed 20 pounds per acre, abatement cost 
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is less than ten dollars per acre. However, the costs of abatement increase greatly if the 
emission level is set at 10 lbs per acre. 
Table 7. Cost of Abatement and Tax Levels Required to Achieve 20 and 10 Pounds of 
Nitrogen Leachate Per Acre by Soil Series. 
Soil Series CA20 CA Tax for Tax for 
lbs 10 lbs 20 lbs 10 lbs 
Pulaski 0 17.35 0 400% 
Cobb fine sandy loam 0 30.73 0 700% 
Cobb fine sandy loamb 0 0 0 0 
Reinach silt loam 9.46 46.91 300% 500% 
Shellabarger 0 13.59 0 400% 
Shellabargerb 0 0 0 0 
Dougherty loamy fine sand 0 5.43 0 200% 
Dougherty & Eufala 0 5.43 0 200% 
Dougherty & Eufala complexb 0 0 0 0 
Eufala fine sand 3.33 21.09 50% 400% 
Hardeman 0 5.436 0 25% 
Grant loam 0 18.57 0 400% 
Grant loamb 0 0 0 0 
Woodward silt loam 0 21.88 0 400% 
Konowa loamy fine sand 0 7.88 0 300% 
Lucien Dill fine sandy loam 0 117.40 0 150% 
Noble fine sandy loam 0 7.08 0 300% 
Noble fine sandy loamb 0 0 0 0 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 0 23.38 0 550% 
Pond Creek fine sandy loamb 0 185.22 0 700% 
Minco very fine sand 8.64 75.97 300% 700% 
Port silt loam 0 20.49 0 400% 
Port silt loamb 0 0 0 0 
McLain 0 0 0 0 
a Cost of abatement estimated as difference between base solution expected 
net returns and solution with emission level imposed. 
b Denotes irrigated acres. 
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Lucien and inigated Pond Creek series have costs which exceed $100.00 per acre and 
reflect the relative im!)ortance of nutrients in maintaining yields as well as the leachability of the 
soil. The Minco seriP,s also has high abatement costs. Note that Reinach, which has the 
highest level ofleachate, does not have as large abatement costs as some of the other soils. 
This implies that the marginal productivity of nutrients is not as great for Reinach as for the 
Lucien or Pond Creek series. Comparatively, however, costs of abatement are still large. The 
lowest abatement costs are for the Hardeman and Dougherty series with a $5.43 difference 
between unrestricted expected net returns and returns with the emission level imposed. 
Finally, these abatement cost are implicitly the lower bound on the per acre ten 
year cost of achieving a given emission level. These estimates could be used as a measure 
of total investment needed to induce agents who produce on the specific soil series to 
follow nitrogen and input recommenpations or as a baseline in a cost benefit analysis of 
different policies aimed at reducing leachate. 
Spatially Differentiated Tax Levels 
Like the abatement costs estimated above, tax levels required to achieve emission levels 
are also representative of the relative productivity of each soil. The method described in the 
procedures section was used to derive input tax levels required to achieve 20 and IO lbs of 
leachate per acre for each of the soil series and are listed in Table 7. The relative tax levels 
between the 20 and IO pound leachate levels reflects the same relationships found between the 
abatement costs for higher and lower emission standards. Moving from 20 to IO lbs of 
leachate requires higher input tax levels. Relatively, soils for which nutrient marginal 
productivity is high require higher tax levels at both the 20 and 10 lbs levels. 
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The tax levels required to achieve the leachate levels are high. The 400, 500, and 
700% levels required to achieve a 10 pound emissions level are obviously a reflection of 
nutrient productivity and price inelasticity of nitrogen. However, these levels are 
comparable to levels found in other studies. Pan and Hodge needed a tax of790% to 
reduce nitrate leachate by 50%. These estimates closely match the reduction implied under 
the 10 pound emission level. Similarly, Johnson, Adams and Perry found that a 100% tax 
on nitrogen fertilizer was needed for a 33% decrease in leachate. These estimates will 
vary depending on the production response for each soil. 
The differences in tax rates for the different soil series obviates the inherent 
problem of a blanket ad valorem tax on nitrogen fertilizer and the need for a spatially 
differentiated tax. The impositions of a fixed nitrogen tax could not be effective or 
efficient since no one single tax rate could achieve an emissions standard. 
For example, if a regulator chooses to impose a single tax rate, the question of what 
tax level to impose arises. If the most prevalent soil in the administrative region is targeted, 
such as the Pond Creek series in this case, agents producing on other soil series would be over 
taxed since Pond Creek requires the highest tax level to achieve the standard. Or, if the most 
common tax rate is chosen, 400%, then emission standards would not be met on all the soils. 
Land Use Permits 
Using the method described in the procedure section, optimal land use required to 
meet an emission standard of IO pounds of nitrate leachate per acre was found. Looking at 
the cropping percentages presented in Table 8, the land use imposed by land use permits 
shows that on dryland acres the optimal mix requires decreased cropping of winter wheat 
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and a change from continuous dryland cotton to dryland cotton and grain sorghum 
rotation. For those soils in which dryland cotton was grown, winter wheat is decreased 
from the upper bound of70% of land to less than 50% ofan acre and on most soils total 
wheat acreage is less than 25%. The spatial variability is reflected in the percentages of winter 
wheat cropped for each soil. Note that for the soils which have the most leachate, winter 
wheat acreage is scaled back considerably. For example, wheat acreage on the Reinach series 
declines from 70% to less than I 0% under I.and use permits. Implicitly, land retirement is 
required on some of the soil series since total percentages do not sum to one. On those 
acreages for which winter wheat was the only crop, less than 60% of the land is used. 
On the irrigated soils, the only soil impacted is the Pond Creek series. The cropping 
change implied by the land use permit is a decreas.e in irrigated cotton and an increase in 
• dryland cotton reflecting the increased potential for nitrate leachate under irrigation. Cropping 
does not change for the other irrigated soils since nitrate leaching was not a problem on these 
soils. 
Corresponding to the land use and resulting land retirement, the net returns are 
decreased under the land use.permits.·. Percentage changes in net returns from base line 
solutions are given in Table 8. On some soils, net returns are diminished by as much as 
75% below baseline solutions as on the Lucien series. Decreases in net returns average 15 
percent below baseline. It is obvious that decreases in net returns would be much greater if 
the differences between soil productivity were not recognized under the permit system. 
Similar to the uniform tax level, requiring all soils to decrease winter wheat acreage by 
62% as with the Reinach series would be extremely costly and inefficient. 
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Table 8. Land Use Required for JO lb. Per Acre of Nitrogen Leachate. 
Soil Series I/I" D/Db DISC W/Wd P/Pe P/Jr pfDB Expected Leachateh NetRetumsi Net Returns 
lbs I acre $ I acre % Change from 
Base Solutions 
Pulaski .3 .3 .11 10.0 464.8(> -21.9 
Cobb Fine sandy loam .3 .3 .23 10.0 451.24 -15 
Cobb Fine sandy loam j .5 .5 6.69 1577.72 0 
Reinach silt loam .3 .3 .08 10.0 317.40 -35 
Shellabarger .3 .3 .26 10.0 350.29 -16 
Shellabargerj .5 .5 8.6 1359.42 0 
Dougherty loamy fine sand .3 ,3 .21 9.98 399.85 -8 
Dougherty and Eufala .3 .3 .21 9.98 399.85 -8 
Dougherty & Eufala complexj .5 .5 7.9 1644.88 -22 
Eufala fine sand .3 .. 3 .24 I<W 317.61 -36.5 
Hardeman .78 10.0 , 199.94 -15 
-
Grant loam .3 .3 .23 10.0 536.69 0 
~ Grant loami .5 .5 6.5 2262.95 0 
Woodward silt loam .55 10.0 128.48 -45 
Konowa loamy fine sand .3 .3 .36 10.0 275.44 -7 
Lucien Dill fine sandy loam .59 8.7 54.3 -75 
Noble Fine sandy loam .3 .3 .33 10.0 368.34 -6 
Noble Fine sandy loam j .5 .5 9.5 1585.29 -0 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam .3 .3 .27 10.0 478.32 ~13 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam j .5 .11 .39 10.0 1762.53 -12 
Minco very fine sand .3 .3 .05 10.0 .. 341.76 -20 
Port Silt Loam .3 .3 .38 10.0 482.70 -14 
Port Silt Loam j .5 .5 5.3 1816.15 -3 
McLainj 
.3 .3 .4 6.6 924.90 0 
• Continuous irrigated cotton; b Continuous dryland cotton; c Sorghum after dryland cotton; d COntinuous wheat; 
e Peanuts; r Irrigated cotton after peanuts; 8 Dryland cotton after peanuts. 
h Steady state levels for one acre . 
i Expected ten year discounted net returns. 
j Denotes Irrigated Soils. 
The cropping percentages point to the inherent weakness in command and control 
approaches to control\ing emissions. Because the only control a regulator exerts in this case 
with land use permit~ is essentially what is cropped, inefficiency results. While theoretically it is 
possible for an omnipotent regulator to choose both input levels as well as cropping choices as 
was shown in the theoretical section, this is not a practical solution to controlling emissions. 
For areas in which significant leachate problems exist, these results may point to some 
combination of policies to control emissions such as a uniform restriction on nitrogen 
application imposed in conjunction with a system of land use permits. 
Sub -Watershed Analysis 
The importance of recognizing the unique spatial characteristics in formulating 
environmental policy is clear. Using the analysis above, the impacts of each of these two 
policies can be compared for their efficiency at controlling emissions on the sub-watershed 
scale. Table 9 presents the differences between the two policies and compares them to a 
uniform tax imposed on all soils. 
A comparison of total returns for each of the soil series shows that the spatially 
differentiated tax is much more efficient than the system of land use permits. While both 
policies meet the emission standard, the total returns for the differentiated tax policy, 
except for a few cases, are much higher than the system of land use permits. Grant loam is 
the only series for which land permits produce a greater net return than the differentiated 
tax system. For some series, such as Hardeman, the difference is as great as 46%. For 
the Pond Creek series, which is the most prevalent soil series in the study area, the 
difference in the dry land returns is 5. 5% while the irrigated cropping returns difference is 
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7. 7%. These relative differences hold when compared to the base solutions with the 
differentiated tax polices being the most efficient. When total returns over all the soil 
series are compared, differentiated taxes decrease total net returns by 6. 75% from the 
baseline while the system ofland use permits decreases total net returns by 12%.While 
both policies are set to meet the emission standard of IO lbs. of nitrate leachate per acre, 
there is a difference in the total level ofleachate. Total levels ofleachate are greater under 
the system of land use permits than that under the system of differentiated taxes. However, 
the percentage difference is less than 3% with both decreasing total leachate by more than 
40% below base line levels. 
For comparison, Table 9 also lists the impacts the imposition of a uniform tax on 
each of the soil series. A tax level of 400% was chosen since this was the level required 
most frequently to achieve the 10 pound emission standard (Table 7). When compared to 
the other two policies the inefficiency of this policy is obvious. Note that on the soils for 
which higher tax levels are required, the producer is penalized and the emission standard is 
not met for that soil. For example, under the uniform tax the dryland Pond series returns 
are decreased by 7% but since a tax level of 550% is needed to achieve the emission 
standard ·the· 1evel of leachate will exceed the standard. Since Pond Creek is the most 
prevalent series, total leachate is greatly increased. Total leachate under the uniform tax is 
33% below the baseline but since it is 14% greater than total leachate under the system of 
land use permits emission standards are obviously not met. 
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Table 9. Cobb-Fast Runner Sub-Watershed Net Returns Under Land Use Permits, 
Differentiated Taxes, Uniform Standard, and Base Solution Policies. 
Soil Series Land Usea Differentiated1 Uniform3 Tax Basea 
Permits Taxes Solution 
Pulaski 592.82 683.60 686.60 759.63 
Cobb fine sandy loam 3202.88 3227.72 3503.75 3788.53 
Cobb fine sandy loam b 561.49 561.51 545.69 561.49 
Reinach silt loam 244.74 . 333.66 339.42 381.53 
Shellabarger 58.87 62.82 62.82 70.91 
Shellabarger b 1209.50 1209.50 1235.15 1209.50 
Dougherty loamy fine sand 1932.92. 2035.21 1949.69 2118.70 
Dougherty & Eufala 830.09 874.02 837.29 909.87 
Dougherty & Eufala complex b 2439.12 2439.12 2439.12 2439.12 
Eufala fine sand 536.91 593.20 593.19 689.88 
Gracemont 113.03 124.88 124.88 145.24 
Hardeman 494.14 726.35 614.44 778.20 
Grant Loam 3703.29 4021.25 4021.44 4404.56 
Grant Loamb 9328.66 9325.78 9040.26 9327.43 
Woodward silt loam 19.05 27.05 · 27.05 34.99 
Konowa loamy fine sand 277.74. 270.00 259.42 299.44 
Lucien Dill fine sandy loam 39.72 120.49 118.35 163.68 
Noble fine sandy loam 455.16 447.22 433.624 488.48 
Noble fine sandy loam b 908.96 908.96 911.25 908.96 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam 63395.51 67134.40 68201.33 73603.58 
Pond Creek fine sandy loam b 42183 .21 45743.30 47755.00 48130.89 
Minco very fine sand 43.92 47.31 50.51 55.41 
Port silt loam 1374.29 1468.24 1468.24 1613.47 
Port silt loam b 2118.57 2190.09 1967.29 2190.09 
McLainb 411.45 411.05 269.83 411.05 
Total Returns 136476.04 144986.73 147152.55 155484.59 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
% Decrease from Base Returns 12.2% 6.75% 5.3% 0 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
Total Leachate c 1964.13 1872.89 2296.58 3435.34 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
% Change from Base Leachate -.428 -.454 
a Expected ten year discounted net returns in IOOO's of dollars. 
b Denotes irrigated soils. 
c Units are IOOO's of pounds of nitrate leachate. 
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-.331 0 
Costs and Transfers 
For the two policies considered, there are considerable differences in total costs. 
Wealth transfers from producers occur from both the diminished value of production and 
diminished land values. An upper bound on the decrease in land values is the difference 
between net returns under the land use permits and the baseline polices. Differences in net 
returns are high (Table 8). Under the system ofland use permits, land values are likely to 
be lower than those under a spatially differentiated tax because producers can still make 
production choices in favor of crops which require less nitrogen while the same cannot be 
said for the land use permits. Further, the tax system produces revenues which further 
lowers the net social costs of implementing a tax. Ten year discounted revenues collected 
from the tax on nitrate would equate to $12,166,895. Assuming that all tax revenues are 
returned to the producer, it is estimated that the net difference in the spatially 
differentiated tax system is only 5. 9% which enforces the case for using a spatially 
differentiated tax. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The main purpose of this research has been to investigate the impacts of 
considering spatial characteristics in the formation of policies which abate agricultural 
non-point source pollution. The initial theoretical examination seeks to develop an 
understanding that the spatial nature of agriculture must be incorporated into policies. 
The inefficiency of uniform input taxes and infeasibility of marketable emission permits 
are explained. Spatially sensitive policies ofland use permits and spatially differentiated 
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taxes are examined. The existence of an allocation of land use permits which results in a 
cost minimizing emissions level is proved. If the relative weaknesses of the land use 
permit systems are ~onsidered, the permit system suffers from the same criticisms as those 
extended to most command and control approaches and the ability to control emissions 
depends on the spatial variation. Spatially differentiated input taxes do not have these 
weaknesses and maintain the appeal ·of market oriented policies. 
Because the comparative efficiency of these policies becomes an empirical 
question, an analytical framework is developed to examine the importance of considering 
spatial differences and the relative efficiency of these two policies in controlling nitrate 
leachate for a sub-watershed in Western Oklahoma: Control ofleachate from the 
application of fertilizers is an important and often studied problem. The framework is 
comprised of a geographic information system and a biophysical model. The biophysical 
model accounts for differences in cropping rotations and nutrient carryover. Because 
leachate is dependent on stochastic rainfall patterns, the biophysical model incorporates 
rainfall using a gaussian-quadrature approach. Arc-View GIS is used to identify soils, 
acreage, and land use for the Cobb-Fastrunner sub-watershed and the biophysical model is 
used to identify optimal cropping and nutrient application for each soil. Parameters for the 
bio-physical model are obtained using site specific soil parameters input into EPIC-5300, a 
biophysical simulation program. 
This framework is adapted to compare and contrast the efficiency of both a system 
of land use permits and spatially differentiated nitrogen input taxes for each soil and the 
whole sub-watershed. The analysis makes clear the importance of recognizing differences 
in soils. A baseline is established by solving the model without an emissions goal and 
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deviations of net returns from this baseline under the polices aimed at achieving a 
emissions level are used to estimate costs of abating nitrate leachate. 
Relative leachability and soil productivity determine the cost of abatement The 
costs of achieving IO pounds of nitrate per acre were as high as $117 and as low as $5. 00. 
Similarly, the levels of input taxes required to achieve the desired emissions level reflect 
the spatial variability of the soils. Failure to consider these differences could result in 
inefficient policies and this is examined in the whole sub-watershed analysis. 
Under the system of land use permits, weaknesses of command and control 
approaches are borne out. The difficulty in controlling both input levels and cropping 
choices is clear. When compared to the system of spatially differentiated taxes, the 
theoretical appeal of market oriented approaches holds. For the Cobb-Fastrunner sub-
watershed, a IO pound emissions target under spatially differentiated taxes decreased net 
returns from the baseline.by only 6% while land use permits decreased total net returns by 
more than 12%. Thus, one of the major conclusions of this study is that market oriented 
approaches are likely to be more efficient than command and control approaches. Further, 
a market oriented approach which considers spatial characteristics is superior. A uniform 
tax fails to recognize differences in soils and soil productivities is not effective at achieving 
the emissions standard efficiently. 
An additional difference between the system of land use permits and spatially 
differentiated taxes is that no additional revenue is created. Input taxes can create 
additional revenue which lowers the net social cost of the polices and increases the 
difference in net costs of the two policies. These revenues could be used to defray both 
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administration of the policy as well as the cost to the producers in terms of net revenue 
and diminished land values. 
Policy Implications 
Extrapolation of the results obtained from the analysis on the Cobb-Fastrunner 
sub-watershed shows that policy makers interested in developing efficient policies must 
take spatial characteristics of agricultural production into account. Total returns were 
decreased by more under the command and control approach of land use permits than 
under the spatiality differentiated tax on nitrogen. However, total net returns would be 
less if individual productivity andleachability of the soils were not considered. Similarly, 
the spatially differentiated tax is much more efficient than a uniform standard because it 
accounts for spatial differences. These results· suggest that federal agencies seeking new 
and innovative approaches to controlling non-point poll~tion in agriculture should 
consider policies such as the spatially differentiated tax. 
Finally, while every effort was ~ade to develop correct soil parameters and 
accurate simulation data for this analysis, the author makes no policy recommendations for 
the Cobb-Fastrunner sub-watershed. Additional validation of yields and nitrate leachate 
should be conducted to establish accuracy. Also, the biophysical model should be 
expanded to reflect more cropping choices since producers may abandon common cultural 
practices with the new cropping flexibility established by 1996 Farm Bill legislation. While 
these implications would not change the conclusions of the above analysis, they do 
represent future directions for this research. 
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APPENDIX 
Example Optimization Program Coded in Gams 
************************************************************************ 
*Optimal Control Progam with Stochastic Rainfall Using Gaussian Points* 
************************************************************************ 
$0FFSYMLIST OFFSY~REF 
Sets 
T time periods /0*10/ 
J Gauss points /1*5/ 
0 leach levels /1*4/ 
Q ntax level /1*6/ 
I Crops 
I cl ict· ict 
c2 dct dct 
c3 dct_srg 
c4 · wht wht 
cs pnt_pnt' 
c6 pnt_ict 
c7 pnt_dct 
cs pnt_srg 
I 
N Yield 
I bl intercep 
b2 precip 
b3 irga 
b4 fl 
bS pr2 
b6 i2 
b7 irpr 
b8 flpr 
b9 flir 
blO n2 I 
L Leachate 
I 11 precip 
12 irga 
13 no3 avail 
14 yield l 
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A available nitrogen 
I al intercept 
a2 precip 
a3 fno3 
a4 nitrogen minearalized 
as no3 carry 
a6 nitrogen fixed 
a7 intercept I 
M nitrogen mineralized 
I ml fno3 
m2 prep 
m3 irga h 
Table yld(I,N) Yield Response Parameters 
bl b2 b3 b4 bS 
cl 251. 9326 -8.6759 0. 0000. -0.6378 0.3143 
c2 50.7568 3.6780 0.0000 1.2394 0.1575 
c3 31.2146 -0.1235 .0. 0000 0.2353 0.0011 
c4 24.8001 -0.1235 0.0000 0.2353 0.0011 
cs 239.2635 32.2467 51.9649 27.1320 -0.0011 
c6 248.3606 8.1517 -18.5868 _46. 7750 -0.1348 
c7 -14.4339 13.6044 ci.0000 0.5588 -0.0592 
ca 31. 2146 -0.1235 0.0000 0.2353 0.0011 
+ b6 b7 b8 b9 blO 
cl 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058 0.0000 0.0014 
c2 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0803 0.0000 0.0010 
c3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 0.0000. -0.0018 
c4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 0.0000 -0.0018 
cs -0.5135 -0.3315 -0.9544 -0.2598 -0.0553 
c6 0.3144 -0.0033 -0.2029 0.2547 -0.9997 
c7 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1431 0.0000 0.0143 
ca 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 0.0000 -0.0018 
Table lch(I,L) Leachate Response Parameters 
11 12 13 14 
cl 1.2497 -0.6023 0.1018 0.00 
c2 -0.1684 0.0000 0.3798 0.00 
c3 0.4902 0.0000 0.1083 0.00 
c4 -0.1365 0.0000 0.1856 0.00 
cs 0 .1723 1.0177 0.0324 o.oo 
c6 0.1729 0.0521 0.2358 o.oo 
c7 0.2437 0.0000 0.0292 o.oo 
ca 0.2053 0.0000 0.0195 o.oo 
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Table an(I,A) Available Nitrogen Response Parameters 
al 
cl -3.3671 
c2 -2.2572 
c3 -1.5959 
c4 -0.5783 
cs -0.5410 
c6 0.0253 
c7 -0.1086 
ca -0.3086 
+ a6 
cl 0.0000 
c2 0.0000 
c3 0.0000 
c4 0.0000 
cs 0.0188 
c6 0.0000 
c7 0.0000 
ca 0.0000 
a2 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-0.3467 
-0.0824 
0.0000 
0.0000 
a7 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
a3 
0.8845 
0.6996 
0.5162 
0.9152 
0.0000 
0.0879 
1.1940 
0.1282 
a4 
1.7242 
1.3834 
0.8857 
0.1590 
0.5772 
0.2555 
0.1845 
0.7054 
as 
0.5659 
0.5121 
0.4203 
0.2518 
-0.2465 
-0.3922 
-0.3625 
-0.7915 
Table mn(I,M) · mineralized nitrogen response parameters 
ml 
cl 0.1399 
c2 0.4183 
c3 0.1726 
c4 0.8761 
cs 0.6415 
c6 0.0209 
c7 0.4323 
ca 0.5292 
m2 
1.8235 
1. 7325 
1.9098 
1.8137 
1.3457 
0.8444 
1.7072 
1.4867 
m3 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.6453 
0.9254 
0.0000 
0.0000 
; 
Parameters 
******************************************** 
* n03 fi'xed * 
******************************************** 
nfix(i) I cl 0.000 
c2 0.000 
c3 0.000 
c4 0.000 
cs 94.654 
c6 0.000 
c7 0.000 
ca 0.000 
I 
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r(j) 
/1 3.1953 
2 11.012 
3 21. 512 
4 32.093 
5 40.166 I 
P( j) /1 .064855 
2 .263788 
3 .351760 
4 .239989 
5 .064855 I 
*************************~~~****************************************** 
* net returns * 
********************************************************************** 
nr(i) I cl .3363 
c2 .4436 
c3 1.15. 
c4 1.880 
cs .1722 
c6 .3363 
c7 .4436 
ca 1.15 
I 
rd(!) I 
cl 1 
c2 1 
c3 1 
c4 1 
cs 1 
c6 1 
c7 1 
ca 1 
I 
pnt(Q) I 
1 .1625 
2 .195 
3 .2275 
4 .26 
5 .39 
6 .52 
I 
ml (0) I 
1 1000 
2 so 
3 20 
4 10 
/; 
131 
************************************************************************ 
* miscellaneous parameters * 
************************************************************************ 
parameter mtm sum total leachate; 
mtm= (1000000); 
scalar delta discount rate /.05/; 
scalar disc discount; 
disc= 1/(l+delta); 
parameter rho(T) discount factor; 
rho(T)= Disc**(ORD(T)); 
parameter pn price of nitrogen per actual lb of no3; 
pn=.13; 
parameter pw price of water per acre inch; 
pw=3.20; 
parameter totlech(O); 
totlech(O)=l; 
******************************'***************************************** 
* ·variabl~s * 
************************************************************************ 
variables 
n3(I,T) nitrogen fe+tilizer applied to the i'th crop 
G(I,T) land fraction for the ith crop 
w(I,T) irrigaton water applied to the i'th crop 
netret net revenue 
lc(I,T) leachate.variable 
lc2(I,T) 2cd leachate varaible 
tyLd(I,T) yield variable 
rzn(I,T) root zone nitrogen 
min(I,T) nitrogen minearlized 
mmm rhs on the leach constraint; 
positive variables n3,G,w,rzn,min; 
************************************************************************ 
* equations * 
************************************************************************ 
equations 
netrevl 
crrycl(T) 
crryc2(T) 
crryc3(T) 
crryc4(T) 
crrycS(T) 
crryc6(T) 
crryc7(T) 
crrycB(T) 
net revenue for lechate restriction 
carryover equation for available nitrogen 
carryover equation for available nitrogen 
carryover equation for available nitrogen 
carryover equation for available nitrogen 
carryover equation for available nitrogen 
carryover equation for available nitrogen 
carryover equation for available nitrogen 
carryover equation for available nitrogen 
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leachate equation leach(I,T) 
leach2(I,T) 
minliz(I,T) 
yield(I,T) 
landrestcl(T) 
landrestc4(T) 
landrestc3(T) 
landrestc2(T) 
mleachl(T) 
totland(T) 
second leachate equation 
nitrogen minearlized 
yield response function 
land restriction 
land restriction 
land restriction 
land restriction 
sumtotal leach 
total land percent less than 1 
netrevl •• sum(T $(0RD(T) GT l),(rho(T)* 
( 
sum(I,rd(I)*(nr(I)*sum(J, 
( 
p(j)*(yld(I, 'bl') 
+yld(I,'b2')*r(j) 
+w (I, T) *yld (I, 'b3') + 
(rzn(I,T) )*yld(I, 'b4' )+ 
(yld(I, 'b5' )*r(j)**2)+ 
(yld(I, 'b6')*w(I,T)**2)+ 
yld(I,'b7')*r(j)*w(I,T)+ 
yld(I, 'b8' )*(rzn(I,T) )*r(j )+· 
yld(I,'b9')*(rzn(I,T))*w(I,T)+ 
(rzn(I,T)**2)*yld(I, 'blO') 
) 
) ) -w ( I, T) *pw-n3 (I, T) *pn) *G. (I, T) ) ) ) ) =E=netret; 
yield( I, T) •• rd( I) *sum(J,p,(j) * 
( ( ( 
yld(I,'bl')+ 
yld (I, 'b2' ) * ( r ( j)) + 
yld(I, 'b3')*w(I,T)+ 
yld(I, 'b4' )*( (rzn(I,T)) )+ 
yld (I, 'bS' ) * ( ( r ( j) ) * ( r ( j)) ) + 
yld(I,'b6')*(w(I,T)**2)+ 
yld(I, 'b7' )*(r(j) )*w(I,T)+ 
yld (I, 'b8' ) * ( ( rzn (I, Tl)* ( r ( j))) + 
yld(J, 'b9')*((rzn(I,T))*w(I,T))+ 
yld(I, 'blO') * ( (rzn(I,T)) * (rzn(I,T))) 
))))=E=tyld(I,T); 
crrycl(T+l) •• sum(J,p(j)*( 
r(J)*an( 'cl', 'al' )+w( 'cl',T+l)*an( 'cl', 'a2') 
+n3('cl',T+l)*an('cl','a3')+min('cl',T+l)*an('cl','a4') 
+ ( ( G ( 'c 1 ' , T+ 1) / ( G ( ' c 1 ' , T) +G ( 'c6' , T) ) ) *rzn ( 'cl' , T) 
+(G('c6',T+l)/(G('cl',T)+G('c6',T)))*rzn('c6',T))*an('cl','a5') 
) )=E=rzn( 'cl' ,T+l); 
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crryc2(T+l) •• sum(J,p(j)*( 
r ( J) *an ( 'c2' , 'al' ) +w ( 'c2' , T+l) *an ( 'c2', 'a2' ) 
+n3('c2',T+l)*an('c2','a3')+min('c2',T+l)*an('c2','a4') 
+ ( ( G ( • c2 • , T+ 1) / ( G ( • c2 • , T) +G ( 'c7 • , T) ) ) *rzn ( • c2 ' , T) 
+ (G ( • c7' , T+l) / ( G ( 'c2 • , T) +G ( • c7' , T) ) ) *rzn ( 'c7' , T)) *an ( 'c2' , 'as' ) 
) ) =E=rzn ( • c2 ' , T+ 1) ; 
crryc3(T+l) •• sum(J,p(j)*( 
r(J)*an('c3','al')+w('c3',T+l)*an('c3','a2') 
+n3('c3',T+l)*an('c3','a3')+min('c3',T+l)*an('c3','a4') 
+(G( 'c2' ,T+l)/(G( 'c3' ,T)+G( 'c2' ,T)) )* 
(rzn('c2',T))*an('c3','aS') 
+ ( G ( 'c3' , T+ 1) / ( G ( 'c3' , T) +G ( 'c2' , T) ) ) * 
(rzn('c2',T))*an('c3','aS') 
) ) =E=rzn ( ' c3 ' , T+ 1) ; 
crryc4(T+l) •• sum(J,p(j)*( 
r(J)*an('c4','al')+w('c4',T+l)*an('c4','a2') 
+n3('c4',T+l)*an('c4','a3')+min('c4',T+l)*an('c4','a4') 
+ ( G ( 'c4' , T+ 1) / ( G ( 'c4' , T) +G ( 'ca' , T) ) ) * 
( ( rzn ( 'c4' , T) ) ) * an ( 'c4' , 'as' ) 
) ) =E=rzn ( ' c4 ' , T+ 1) ; 
crrycS(T+l) •• sum(J,p(j)*( .·· 
r ( J) *an ( 'cs' , 'al' ) +w ( 'cs' , T+l) *an ( 'c!:i' , ·, a2' ) 
+n3( •cs• ,T+l)*an( •cs•, 'a3' )+min( •cs• ,T+l)*an( •cs•, 'a4') 
+nfix('cS')*an('cS', 'a6'))) 
=E=rzn('cS',T+l); 
crryc6 (T+l) •• sum(J,.p( j) * ( 
r(J)*an( 'c6', 'al' )+w( '.c6' ,T+l)*an( 'c6', 'a2') 
+n3('c6',T+l)*an('c6','a3')+min('c6',T+l)*an('c6','a4') 
+ ( ( G ( 'c6' , T+ 1) / ( G ( 'cs' , T) ) ) *rzn ( 'cs• , T) ) *an ( 'c6 • , 'as' ) 
) )=E=rzn( 'c6' ,T+l); 
crryc7(T+l) •• sum(J,p(j)*( 
r(J)*an('c7','al')+w('c7',T+l)*an('c7','a2') 
+n3('c7',T+l)*an('c7','a3')+min('c7',T+l)*an('c7','a4') 
+( (G( 'c7' ,T+l)/(G( •cs• ,T)) )*rzn( •cs• ,T) )*an( 'c7', •as•) 
))=E~rzn('c7',1+1); 
crryca(T+l) •• sum(J,p(j)*( 
r(J)*an( 1 ca•,•al')+w( 1 ca 1 ,T+l)*an( 1 ca 1 ,'a2') 
+n3( 1 ca',T+l)*an( 1 ca','a3')+min( 1 ca 1 ,T+l)*an( 1 ca•, 1 a4') 
+( (G( •ca• ,T+l)/(G( 'cS' ,T)) )*rzn( 'cS' ,T) )*an( •ca•, 'a.S') 
) ) =E=rzn ( ' ca ' , T+ 1) ; 
minliz(I,T) •• 
min(I,T)=E=(sum(J,p(j)*(r(J)*mn(I,'m2')+ 
n3 ( I, T) *mn ( I, • ml ' ) +w (I, T) *mn (I, 'm3 ' ) ) ) ) ; 
leach(I,T) .• 
lc(I,T)=E=((sum(J,p(j)*(r(J)*lch(I,'11') 
+(rzn(I,T)+n3(I,T)+min(I,T)+nfix(I))*lch(I,'13')+ 
tyld (I, T) * lch (I, '14' ) +w (I, T) * lch (I, '12' ) ) ) ) ) ; 
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leach2(I,T) •• 
lc2(I,T)=E=((sum(J,p(j)*((r(J)*lch(I,'ll') 
+(rzn(I,T)+n3(I,T)+min(I,T)+nfix(I))*lch(I,'13')+ 
t y ld (I, T) * lch (I, ' 14 ' ) +w (I, T) * lch ( I, ' 12 • ) ) ) ) ) *G (I, T) ) ; 
************************************************************************ 
* restrictions * 
************************************************************************ 
mleachl ( T) •• 
sum(I,lc(I,T)*G(I,T)) =L= mmm; 
landrestc2(T+l) •• G('c2',T+l) =L=G('c2',~)+G('c7',T); 
landrestcl(T+l) •. G('cl',T+l) =L=G('cl',T)+G('c6',T); 
landrestc4(T+l) •• G('c4',T+l) =L= G('~4',T); 
landrestc3(T+l) •• G('c3',T+l)~L~G('c2',T)+G('c7',T)f 
totland(T) •• sum(I,G(I,T)) =L= 1; 
. ' . 
**************~*****************•*~******************~****************** 
* lower land limits * 
**************************************~********************************* 
G. LO ( I Cl I 'T) = .0001; 
G • LO ( ' C2 ' , T ) = .0001; 
G. LO ( ' C3 ' , T) = .0001; 
G. LO ( ' C4 ' , T) = .0001; 
G.LO( 'CS' ,T) = .0001; 
G. LO ( ' C6 ' , T) = .0001; 
G. LO ( ' C7 ' , T) = .0001; 
G • LO ( I cs ' ' T ) = .0001; 
************************************************************************ 
* initial conditions * 
************************************************************************ 
G. l ( 'Cl' , '1' ) = .0001; 
G • 1 ( ' C2 ' , ' 1 ' ) = .002; 
G. l ( ' C3 ' , ' 1 • ) = .002; 
G. l ( ' C4 ' , ' 1 ' ) = .01; 
G .1 ( 'cs' , '1' ) = • s; 
G. 1 ( ' C6 ' , ' 1 ' ) = .01; 
G. l ( ' C7 ' , ' 1 ' ) = .2; 
G • 1 < • ca • , • 1 • > = .2; 
n3. l ( •·c1' , • 1 • ) = O; 
n3 • 1 ( • C2 • , • 1 • ) = O; 
n3. l ( 'C3 ' , ' 1 ' ) = O; 
n3 • l ( ' C4 ' , ' 1 ' ) = O; 
n3 o l ( I CS I I 1 1 I ) = O; 
n3 • l ( ' C6 • , • 1 ' ) = O; 
n3 • 1 ( ' C7 • , ; 1 ' ) = O; 
n3 o l ( I ca I I I 1 1 ) = O; 
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w.l( 'cl', '1') = O; 
w.l('c2','1') = O; 
w.l('c3','1') = O; 
W • l ( I c4 I t f 1' ) = O; 
w.l( •cs•' 'l') = O; 
w • 1 ( I c6 I t I 1 I ) = O; 
w.l('c7','l') = O; 
w. 1 c • ca • , • 1 • > = O; 
rzn.l('cl', 'l') = 66.219 
rzn. 1 ( 'c2 ' , '1' ) = 66.967 
rzn. 1 ( 'c3' , '1' ) = 60.848 
rzn. l ( ' c4 ' , ' 1 • ) = 52.523 
rzn. l (•cs', '1') = 92.017 
rzn. l ( 'c6', '1') = 78.235 
rzn. l ( 'c7' , '1 • ) = 30.392 
rzn. l ( 'c8', '1') = 48.090 
min.l('cl','l') =121. 743 
min. 1 ( • c2 ' , ' 1 ' ) = 61. 708 
min. 1 ( 'c3' , ' 1' ) = 75.303 
min. l ( ' c4 ' , ' 1 ' ) = 53.133 
min. l ('cs', '1') = 14.487 
min. l ( • c6', '1' ). = 8.389 
min.l( 'c7', '1') = 36.863 ; 
min. l ( ' ca ' , ' 1 ' ) = 29.382 
tyld.l('cl','l') = 239.023; 
tyld.l( 'c2', 'l') = 238.471; 
tyld.l( 'c3', '1') = 21. 823; 
tyld.l('c4','l') = 36.463; 
tyld. l ( I cs It I 1') = 795.456; 
tyld. l ( 'c6', '1') = 437.985; 
tyld.l('c7', 'l') = 216.644; 
tyld, l ( I c8' t I 1') = 19.797; 
G.UP( 'Cl' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)=.0001; 
G • UP ( ' C2 ' , T ) $(ORD (T) GT l)=.3; 
G • UP ( ' C3 ' , T) $(ORD (T) GT l)=l; 
G. UP ( ' C4 ' , T) $(ORD (T) GT l)=l; 
g. UP ( I cs I , T) $(ORD (T) GT l)=.0001; 
G. UP ( 'C6' , T) $ (ORD ( T) GT 1)=.0001; 
G . UP ( ' C7 ' , T) $ (ORD ( T) GT 1)=.0001; 
G. UP < • ca • , T > $(ORD (T) GT 1)=.0001; 
n3. UP ( 'Cl ' , T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)= 200; 
n3 • UP ( ' C2 ' , T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= 200; 
n3 • UP ( ' CJ ' , T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= 200; 
n3 • UP ( ' C4 ' , T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= 200; 
n3 • UP ( ' CS • , T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)= 30; 
n3.UP( 'C6' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= 200; 
n3 • UP ( ' C7 • , T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= 200; 
n3 . UP ( • ca • , T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= 200; 
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w. up ( ' Cl ' , T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= 20; 
w.UP( 'C2' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= O; 
w. UP ( ' C3 ' , T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= O; 
w • UP ( ' C4 ' , T ) $(ORD (T) GT l)= O; 
w. UP ( I cs I 'T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= 40; 
w. UP ( ' C6 ' , T) $(ORD ( T) GT l)= 30; 
w • UP ( ' C7 ' , T ) $(ORD (T) GT l)= O; 
w.UP( 'c8' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)= O; 
rzn.UP( 'Cl' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT l)= 86.219 ; 
rzn. UP ( 'C2' , T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)= 86.967 ; 
rzn.UP( 'C3' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)=160.848 ; 
rzn.UP( 'C4' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)=520.523 . . , 
rzn.UP( 'CS' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)=292.017 ; 
rzn.UP( 'C6' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)= 98.235 ; 
rzn.UP( 'C7' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)= 80.392 ; 
rzn.UP( 'CS' ,T) $(ORD (T) GT 1)=148.090 ; 
************************************************************************ 
* model statements * 
****************************~************************~****************** 
model farml /all/; 
option iterlim=20000; 
option limrow=O; 
option limcol=O; 
option reslim=SOOO; 
file al /lNR.out/; 
file a2 /lCl.out/; 
file a3 /1C2.out/; 
file a4 /1C3.out/; 
file as /lC4.out/; 
file a6 /lCS.out/; 
file a7 /lC6.out/; 
file as /lC7.out/; 
file a9 /lea.out/; 
*loop(Q, 
*pn.fx = pnt(Q); 
*solve farml using nlp maximizing netret; 
*totlech('l')=sum(T S(ord (T) GT 1), sum(I,lc.l(I,T)*G.l(I,T))); 
*put al; 
*put/; 
*put netret.1:7:2, totlech('l'):7:2, 
loop(O, 
mmm. fx = ml (0); 
solve farm! using nlp maximizing netret; 
totlech(O)=sum(T $(ord (T) GT l), sum(I,lc.l(I,T)*G.l(I,T))); 
put al; 
put/; 
put netret.l:7:2, totlech(0):7:2, 
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put a2; 
put/; 
loop(T, 
put a2; 
put/; 
put tyld.l('cl',T):7:2, 
put n3.l('cl',T):7:2, 
put rzn.l('cl',T):7:2, 
put w.l('cl',T):7:2, 
put g.l('cl',T):7:2, 
put lc.l('cl',T):7:2, 
lc2. l( 'cl' ,T) :7:2, 
) ; 
put a3; 
put/; 
loop(T, 
put a3; 
put/; 
put tyld.l('c2',T):7:2, 
put n3.l('c2',T):7:2, 
put rzn.l('c2',T):7:2, 
put w.l('c2',T)17:2, 
put g.l('c2',T)~7:2, 
put lc.l('c2',T):7:2, 
lc2.l('c2'rT):7:2, 
) ; 
put a4; 
put/; 
loop(T, 
put a4; 
put/; 
put tyld.l('c3',T):7:2, 
put n3.l('c3',T):7:2, 
put rzn.l('c3',T):7:2, 
put w.l('c3',T):7:2, 
put g.l('c3',T):7:2, 
put lc.1J'c3' ,T),:7:2, 
lc2~1('~3',T):7:2, . 
) ; 
put as; 
put/; 
loop(T, 
put aS; 
put/; 
put tyld.l('c4',T):7:2, 
put n3.l('c4',T):7:2, 
put rzn.l('c4',T):7:2, 
put w.l('c4',T):7:2, 
put g.l('c4',T):7:2, 
put lc.l('c4',T):7:2, 
lc2.l('c4',T):7:2, 
) ; 
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put a6; 
put/; 
loop(T, 
put a6; 
put/; 
put tyld.l('cS',T):7:2, 
put n3.l('c5',T):7:2, 
put rzn.l('cS',T):7:2, 
put w.l('cS',T):7:2, 
put g.l('cS',T):7:2, 
put lc.l('cS',T):7:2, 
lc2.l('C5',T):7:2, 
) ;-
put a7; 
put/; 
loop(T, 
put a7; 
put/; 
put tyld.l('c6',T):7:2, 
put n3.l( 'c6' ,T):7:2, 
put rzn.l('c6',T):7:2, 
put w.l('c6',T):7:2, 
put g.l('c6',T):7:2, 
put lc.l('c6',T):7:2, 
lc2.l( 'C6' ,T) :7,:2, 
) ; 
put a8; 
put/; 
loop(T, 
put a8; 
put/; 
put tyld.l('c7',T):7:2, 
put n3.l('c7',T):7:2, 
put rzn.l('c7',T):7:2, 
put w.l('c7',T):7:2, 
put g. 1 ( 'c7 ' , T) : 7 :.2, 
put lc.l( 'c7' ,T) :7:2, 
lc2~l('c7',T):7:2, 
) ; 
put a9; 
put/; 
loop(T, 
put a9; 
put/; 
put tyld.l('c8',T):7:2, 
put n3.l('c8',T):7:2, 
put rzn.l('cS',T):7:2, 
put w.l('cS',T):7:2, 
put g.l('cS',T):7:2, 
put le .1 ( ' cS' , T) : 7: 2, 
lc2.l('c8',T):7:2, 
) ; 
) ; 
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